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ARBITRATOR LIABILITY: RECONCILING
ARBITRATION AND MANDATORY RULES
ANDREW T. GUZMAN†
ABSTRACT
In this Article, Professor Guzman resolves the tension that exists
between mandatory legal rules and the widespread use of arbitration.
In recent years, U.S. courts have expanded the range of enforceable
arbitration agreements to include agreements that cover areas of law
previously thought to be within the exclusive domain of courts.
Among the disputes that are now deemed arbitrable are those that im-
plicate mandatory rules such as securities and antitrust laws. Under
current law, the willingness of courts to enforce arbitration agree-
ments and to uphold the resulting arbitral awards with minimal judi-
cial review makes it possible for the parties to a transaction to avoid
mandatory rules of law. Until now, it has generally been believed that
the legal system must either restrict the use of arbitration or permit ar-
bitration and accept that doing so turns all mandatory rules into de-
fault rules.
This Article proposes a mechanism that permits the continued use
of arbitration without abandoning the mandatory nature of legal
rules. The recommended approach, called “arbitrator liability,” al-
lows the losing party in an arbitration to sue the arbitrator on the
ground that a mandatory rule was ignored. Under existing legal rules,
arbitrators have an incentive to ignore mandatory rules of law in fa-
vor of the contractual terms agreed to by the parties. Arbitrator liabil-
ity gives arbitrators an incentive to apply mandatory rules of law.
Giving proper incentives to arbitrators will ensure that mandatory
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rules are enforced, thereby eliminating the incentive for the parties to
draft arbitration agreements intended to avoid those rules. The bene-
fits of arbitration can be retained without sacrificing the ability of
lawmakers to adopt mandatory rules.
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If [the arbitrator] fails there is practically no remedy available, be-
cause most laws do not allow [one] to sue an arbitrator for a wrong
decision . . . .1
INTRODUCTION
The use of arbitration to resolve international business disputes
has become commonplace. Indeed, most international contracts now
contain an arbitration clause, making arbitration, rather than court
proceedings, the most common form of dispute resolution for these
transactions.2 By one account, as many as 90% of certain types of
large international transactions include arbitration clauses.3 Despite
the central importance of arbitration, however, it has received scant
attention from legal academics. This Article seeks to contribute to the
academic literature on arbitration by examining the relationship be-
tween mandatory legal rules and arbitration. It concludes that existing
rules governing judicial review of arbitral decisions are not only in-
adequate to ensure that mandatory rules are applied, but they actu-
ally encourage arbitrators to ignore such rules. To address this defi-
ciency, the Article proposes the adoption of a regime of “arbitrator
liability,” under which the parties to an arbitration would have the
right to sue the arbitrators if the latter fail to apply mandatory rules.
Arbitrator liability reconciles the strong support for arbitration evi-
denced by U.S. courts and lawmakers with the need to preserve the
integrity of mandatory legal rules.
The important role of arbitration is, at least in part, the product
of U.S. courts’ willingness to enforce arbitration agreements and
awards over a wide range of subjects. In the past thirty years, many
legal issues that have traditionally been considered “public law” and
within the exclusive domain of courts have become arbitrable, greatly
expanding the range of issues that can be resolved through arbitration
and, therefore, increasing the importance of arbitration.4 The ex-
1. Ottoarndt Glossner, Sociological Aspects of International Commercial Arbitration, in
THE ART OF ARBITRATION 143, 144 (Jan C. Schultsz & Albert Jan Van Den Berg eds., 1982).
2. See Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L
274, 275 (1986).
3. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration Coexist with Judicial Review? A Critique of
LaPine v. Kyocera, ADR CURRENTS, Sept. 1998, at 1, 15 n.28 (noting a large New York law
firm’s experience with international transactions involving investments, joint ventures, technol-
ogy licenses, and trade in goods).
4. See infra Part I.C.
GUZMAN TO PRINTER (FINAL).DOC 09/21/00 12:59 PM
1282 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1279
panded role of arbitration, however, has challenged the legal system’s
efforts to ensure that certain legal rules apply even when parties seek
to contract around them. Although much of the legal framework de-
signed to govern business activities consists of default rules, lawmak-
ers have also seen fit to adopt certain mandatory rules—rules in-
tended to apply to every transaction, regardless of the intent of the
parties. Both the securities laws and the antitrust laws, for example,
are mandatory.5 If, however, the parties to a transaction are permitted
to have their disputes resolved through arbitration rather than by a
court, it is arbitrators rather than judges who are charged, as an initial
matter, with the application of mandatory rules. The rules will truly
be mandatory, therefore, only if arbitrators enforce them even when
doing so is contrary to the wishes of the parties, as stated in the arbi-
tration agreement.
This Article demonstrates that arbitrators6 are unlikely to en-
force mandatory rules when the parties seek to contract around them.
The parties to a transaction have great flexibility in the selection of an
arbitrator, providing the latter with a strong incentive to honor the
arbitration agreement in order to develop a reputation as a desirable
arbitrator. Because arbitrators who ignore mandatory rules face little
or no sanction that might offset the incentive to please the parties to
the transaction, it should be no surprise that they ignore mandatory
rules in favor of the substantive rules contained in the arbitration
agreement. Willingness on the part of arbitrators to enforce the rules
chosen by the parties, even when these are in conflict with mandatory
rules, makes it possible for parties to a transaction to avoid manda-
tory rules.
To date, the literature on the dilemma of mandatory rules and
arbitration has offered no solution that preserves the benefits of arbi-
tration while ensuring that mandatory rules will be enforced. Existing
scholarship has concluded that policymakers must choose between
5. In previous writings, I have commented on the application of securities and antitrust
regulation in an international context. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National
Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855
(1997) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, National Laws]; Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 903 (1998); Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A
Proposal, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 607 (1999) [hereinafter Guzman, Capital Market Regulation]; An-
drew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501 (1998).
6.  For present purposes, the incentives of individual arbitrators and arbitration associa-
tions are identical. For this reason, the Article will use the term “the arbitrator” to refer to indi-
vidual arbitrators, arbitral panels, and arbitration associations, as the context requires.
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two policies: one that looks favorably upon arbitration and allows it
to proceed with minimal judicial intervention, but that compromises
the ability of the United States to enforce mandatory rules, and an-
other that permits substantial judicial review of arbitral awards.7
This Article offers a new solution that permits the enforcement
of mandatory rules while allowing arbitration to proceed with mini-
mal judicial interference. Rather than providing for judicial review of
arbitration agreements or arbitral rulings, the Article recommends
that the parties to the arbitration be given the right to sue the arbitra-
tor for a failure to apply a mandatory law. Arbitrator liability imposes
a cost on an arbitrator who ignores a mandatory rule—providing an
incentive for her to follow such rules. Because this cost is passed on to
the parties, arbitrator liability also eliminates the incentive to draft
arbitration agreements that purport to ignore mandatory rules. This
Article demonstrates that arbitrator liability makes it possible to align
the incentives of the arbitrator and the parties with those of policy-
makers who want mandatory rules to be applied. Unlike other pro-
posals, therefore, arbitrator liability makes it possible to retain the
benefits of arbitration without compromising mandatory rules.
Part I of this Article discusses American attitudes toward arbitra-
tion and explains why the problem of mandatory rules in arbitration
is more serious than it has been in the past. The focus in Part I and
throughout the Article is international arbitration, but the analysis
also applies to the domestic context. Part II explores the incentives of
arbitrators and the parties to a transaction under the current regime,
7. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: As-
sessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265, 297 (1986) (asserting that the
doctrine of Mitsubishi does injustice to the public policy demands of antitrust regulation); Rob-
ert B. von Mehren, From Vynior’s Case to Mitsubishi: The Future of Arbitration and Public
Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 583, 627-28 (1986) [hereinafter von Mehren, Future of Arbitration]
(asserting that arbitrators should be entrusted with public law issues if they are able to establish
their neutrality); William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding
Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 629, 630 (1986) (arguing that arbitral
awards should be enforced without significant judicial review, even at the cost of making man-
datory rules default rules); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1999) (stating that courts must either
make mandatory rules inarbitrable or require de novo review of arbitral awards that implicate
such rules); Christine L. Davitz, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates Enforcement of Regu-
latory Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: From the Bremen’s License to the Sky
Reefer’s Edict, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 95 (1997) (suggesting that the Supreme Court
has expanded the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) beyond congressional intent). But see Eric
A. Posner, Arbitration and Harmonization of International Commercial Law: A Defense of Mit-
subishi, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647, 651 (1999) (contending that a middle ground of randomly re-
viewing some, but not all, arbitral awards may be preferable).
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showing that there is a strong incentive to ignore mandatory rules and
that there is no reason to expect arbitrators to do otherwise. Even the
existing system of judicial review does little to ensure that mandatory
rules are enforced. Part III describes arbitrator liability and explains
why it corrects the incentive problems created by arbitration in the
presence of mandatory rules. It also addresses some potential con-
cerns with arbitrator liability.
I.  ARBITRATION AND ARBITRABILITY
A. The Problem of Arbitration and Mandatory Rules
The regulation of business activity involves both default rules
and mandatory rules. As long as the parties to a transaction internal-
ize all the costs and benefits of their activities, default rules are pref-
erable to mandatory rules because the parties will waive a rule only
when doing so increases their joint profit.8 If they internalize all costs
and benefits, the maximization of joint profits is equivalent to the
maximization of societal benefit.9 Concern for the externalization of
costs or the protection of those who cannot protect themselves, how-
ever, can justify the use of mandatory legal rules.10 Thus, in areas such
as securities regulation, antitrust, intellectual property, and bank-
ruptcy, mandatory laws exist in order to prevent the imposition of
costs on the uninformed or on third parties.11
8. Although this Article proposes a mechanism for reconciling mandatory laws with arbi-
tration, it is not intended to advocate any particular set of mandatory rules. Evaluation of the
merits of specific mandatory rules is beyond the scope of this Article. It will simply be assumed
throughout that mandatory laws are adopted only when they are beneficial. Although this is
clearly not an accurate assumption, it is adopted in order to abstract away from the substantive
question of which mandatory laws should be adopted.
9. See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (arguing that waivers and arbitration
agreements allow parties to make more efficient use of the threat of litigation by avoiding it
when the costs are higher than the return).
10. Other possible justifications for mandatory rules exist, including, for example, the in-
ability of one party (such as a minor) to give informed consent, the possibility of coerced con-
sent, and notions of fairness. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT (1993). In the interests of simplicity and brevity, these alternate justifications are
not considered.
11. For the balance of the Article, it will be assumed that mandatory rules are intended to
prevent the externalization of costs rather than to protect certain parties to the transaction. This
is done only to simplify the discussion. It does not alter any of the results or intuitions of the pa-
per.
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Because arbitration requires the consent of the parties, an arbi-
tration clause exists only when the parties prefer it to the alternative
of dispute resolution before a court. The need for consent implies that
when the parties to a transaction are the only ones affected by the
transaction—that is, when there are no externalities—any form of
dispute resolution upon which the parties agree should be permitted.
In this situation, the right to judicial resolution of disputes should be a
default rule that the parties can waive, and arbitration agreements
should be enforced.12
If, however, arbitration is used to avoid legal rules that are in-
tended to be mandatory, it frustrates rules meant to prevent the ex-
ternalization of costs onto third parties. If parties are able to avoid
mandatory rules in this way, the entire landscape of business regula-
tion is altered because all rules become default rules and the parties
are able to externalize many costs that they would otherwise be
forced to internalize. Such a scheme undermines mandatory laws de-
signed to bring private costs in line with social costs, and it may re-
duce social welfare. Part II of this Article demonstrates that under the
current system, the parties to a transaction are, indeed, able to con-
vert mandatory laws into default laws through the use of arbitration—
making the use of arbitration to resolve issues related to mandatory
laws problematic.
The problem of mandatory laws and arbitration could be re-
solved by preventing the arbitration of disputes involving such laws.
This approach, however, would present its own costs, because in
many cases arbitration offers advantages over traditional litigation.
The benefits of arbitration represent welfare gains for society, making
a simple ban on arbitration undesirable.
Among these benefits are the cost savings that stem from the fact
that an arbitration clause is, above all, a choice-of-forum clause. It
allows the parties to avoid most of the uncertainty and delay involved
in identifying the jurisdiction that will handle the case. It also allows
the parties to select a mutually convenient forum. The absence of
such a forum-selection clause may impose significant costs on the
transaction, including the litigation costs associated with determining
the correct forum, the ex ante costs of uncertainty regarding the fo-
rum that will ultimately resolve any dispute, and the unnecessary
costs of litigation in an inconvenient forum. Although a forum-
12. See Hylton, supra note 9.
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selection clause often affects merely procedural rights, it is clear, at
least in international cases, that the choice of forum can influence the
substantive law to be applied.13 If the parties are unsure of the appli-
cable law, they must take into account each of the laws that may ap-
ply, reducing the efficiency of their activities. This cost of uncertainty
will be particularly important for risk-averse parties whose valuations
of projects are reduced by uncertainty.
Arbitration also provides the benefit of an unbiased forum.14 Just
as individual states in the United States may be perceived to favor in-
state litigants over those from out of state—a concern that gave rise
to diversity jurisdiction in the United States—litigants in an interna-
tional transaction may fear that foreign courts will be biased in favor
of local parties.15 Where each party is suspicious of the other’s courts,
and where no alternative dispute resolution procedure exists, some
positive net present value transactions may never be carried out. In
addition, where a suspicion of bias exists alongside uncertainty re-
garding the choice of forum, the combination may result in a race to
file, in which each party seeks to begin proceedings in its own coun-
try.16
13. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993); Roby v. Corpo-
ration of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1355 (2d Cir. 1993).
14. See Samuel A. Haubold, Opting out of the U.S. Legal System—The Case for Interna-
tional Arbitration, SPG-10 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 43, 44-45 (1997) (citing the ability of parties to
preselect a neutral forum as one of the advantages of arbitration).
15. The risk of bias is likely to be greater between national court systems than it is between
American state courts because the former feature much larger differences in legal rules, legal
culture, and background norms. On the topic of bias in U.S. courts, see generally Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120
(1996).
16. Although the intuition that corrupt courts will reduce the number of valuable transac-
tions is correct, it is not as simple as it first appears. In a simple model, for example, a biased
court system will not prevent the parties from undertaking a profitable project. Imagine a trans-
action in which firms from country A and country B can cooperate by investing $100 each in
period one. This investment yields an expected payoff of $200 per firm in period two. Neither
firm is able to complete the project without the other. If the parties believe disputes will be re-
solved in an unbiased forum, they will pursue this valuable opportunity. Suppose, however, that
each party believes that the courts in the other party’s country are biased. Specifically, each
party believes that, should a dispute arise, the other party’s courts will award any profit entirely
to the local firm, allowing the foreign party to recover only its costs. In period two, therefore,
both parties have an incentive to sue in their own jurisdiction, even if there has been no breach.
The result is a race to the courthouse. Despite the fact that both parties, in period one, expect
this race, they both will be willing to go forward. As long as each party has some chance of win-
ning the race to the courthouse, both parties receive a positive expected return, making the
project worthwhile. (Assume for simplicity that once a suit is filed in one country, the other
country’s courts will not take jurisdiction. This assumption is not necessary, but it simplifies the
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Additionally, the arbitration of international disputes facilitates
the enforcement of subsequent awards. Under the New York Con-
vention,17 arbitral awards made in one Convention state are enforce-
able in any other Convention state on the same basis as domestic ar-
bitral awards, subject to very limited exceptions.18 Because virtually
every significant commercial nation in the world is a party to the
Convention, enforcement of arbitral awards is fairly straightforward.
In contrast to this established and well-functioning international en-
forcement system, there is no global agreement on the enforcement of
court judgments.19 In fact, the United States is not a party to any
treaty regarding the enforcement of judgments.20 As a result, arbitral
awards are often easier to enforce than court judgments.21 The ability
to enforce an award at low cost in virtually every country in the world
is important in international transactions because the assets of a party
example. In extreme cases in which courts cannot agree on the proper forum, the case must be
litigated in both countries, dramatically increasing the costs of the litigation.) And if one party
knows it will always lose the race to the courthouse, it can simply demand a payment up front to
cover its costs and profit. When a suit is filed in period two, this party will be able to retain this
payment, ensuring a positive return. In this simple example, therefore, the presence of a biased
judiciary causes a transfer from one party to the other ex post. The parties, however, are able to
anticipate this outcome and can structure their transaction to take it into account.
In more complex models, however, biased courts may prevent efficient transactions from
taking place. For example, suppose the facts of the above example are unchanged, but imagine
there is also a third period in which the parties will each receive an additional $25. If the game
reaches the third period, the parties will race to the courthouse just as they did in the previous
example. Recognizing this fact, however, and assuming that each party is equally likely to win
the race to file, both parties will prefer to file in period two rather than wait for period three. If
party A knows that party B plans to race to file in period three, then party A is better off filing
in period two. By filing in period two, party A ensures that he is the first to file and, therefore,
receives the benefit of his own court’s bias. This strategy will yield a payoff of $300, with party B
receiving $100. If party A were to wait for period three, he would have only a 50% chance of
winning the race to file and, therefore, would expect a payoff of (0.5)($350) + (0.5)($100) =
$225. Of course, both parties face this same incentive, so the race to file takes place in period
two. This result is inefficient because the period-three return of $50 is lost. Other reasons why
biased courts may lead to inefficient results include the existence of litigation costs, which make
it wasteful to try to benefit from one’s own court’s biases; high discount rates, which may pre-
vent long term agreements; and inaccurate perceptions of bias, which can lead to wasteful litiga-
tion.
17. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
18. See infra note 38.
19. See Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United
States, 579 PLI/LIT 147, 153-54.
20. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition
Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 168
(1998).
21. See Guzman, Capital Market Regulation, supra note 5, at 632.
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may be located in a jurisdiction that is different from the location of
the contract, the location of performance, the party’s principal place
of business, or any other jurisdictional touchstone. The New York
Convention allows the winning party in an arbitration to collect on
the award regardless of the location of the assets.22
Arbitration procedures also are generally more protective of pri-
vacy than are judicial procedures. In the context of an international
transaction, the parties to a dispute may wish to avoid disclosure of
the substance of their dispute—or even the existence of a dispute. In
addition, the parties may wish to adopt discovery procedures that are
more limited than those available under national laws in order to pre-
vent the disclosure of sensitive proprietary information.23
Finally, arbitration offers other procedural advantages over judi-
cial dispute resolution. Depending on the specifics of the case, these
might include a streamlined set of procedural rules leading to a faster
resolution of disputes, a more limited right to appeal, and lower litiga-
tion costs.24
B. The Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention
Although U.S. courts currently have a favorable view of arbitra-
tion and stand willing to enforce arbitration clauses and arbitral
awards in a wide variety of contexts, it has not always been so. For
most of the nineteenth century, courts permitted arbitration and were
willing to enforce arbitral awards,25 but parties were never compelled
to arbitrate their claims. Arbitration required the consent of both par-
ties after the dispute had arisen. Arbitration clauses contained in the
contract were considered to be revocable at will, implying that parties
were unable, at the time of contracting, to commit to arbitration.26
Under a regime in which precommitment to arbitration was not per-
mitted, the willingness of arbitrators to apply mandatory rules was
not an issue. A party that stood to benefit from a mandatory rule
could ensure its application by refusing to arbitrate before an arbitra-
22. See New York Convention, supra note 17, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
23. See Haubold, supra note 14, at 43.
24. In addition to the above list of private benefits, arbitration also has positive effects on
the overall judicial system. It reduces the burden on courts and helps resolve choice-of-law is-
sues that would be difficult for courts to handle consistently across jurisdictions.
25. See, e.g., Karthaus v. Yllas y Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 228 (1828).
26. See von Mehren, Future of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 589-90 (reviewing the 19th-
century Supreme Court rejection of contract arbitration clauses for future disputes).
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tor who was expected to ignore the rule. A refusal to arbitrate, of
course, would bring the dispute before a court. At the time of con-
tracting, therefore, both parties would know that the mandatory rule
would be applied, and the contract would be completed under that as-
sumption. Furthermore, arbitrators wishing to attract business would
have an incentive to develop a reputation for enforcing mandatory
rules rather than the law chosen in the arbitration agreement. The use
of arbitration to avoid mandatory rules was simply not possible with-
out judicial enforcement of binding, irrevocable arbitration clauses.
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).27
The FAA instructs courts that an agreement to arbitrate is “valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable.”28 If there is an arbitration clause, the
FAA provides that, at the request of one of the parties, the court
must refuse to hear the case, forcing the reluctant party into arbitra-
tion.29 In the international context, an agreement to arbitrate is also
supported by the New York Convention, under which such agree-
ments are binding and domestic courts are required to refuse a judi-
cial hearing to parties that have a contractual commitment to arbi-
trate an issue.30 A party that has consented to arbitration through an
arbitration agreement, therefore, cannot later demand a judicial
resolution of an arbitral issue.31
In addition to making arbitration clauses enforceable, the FAA
emphasizes that courts must show deference to arbitral rulings. The
27. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994)).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
29. See id. §§ 3-4.
30. See New York Convention, supra note 17, arts. I, III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
38, 40.
31. Certain areas of law are deemed inarbitrable on the ground that they implicate public
policy questions that should be decided through the public system of dispute resolution rather
than through a private process. An alternative interpretation of the arbitrability issue is that cer-
tain issues should be resolved by courts because there are third-party effects that the parties to a
transaction will not take into account. The question of arbitrability has generally been a matter
for domestic determination rather than international agreement. United States courts, at vari-
ous times, have found each of the following areas to be inarbitrable: the Securities Act of 1933,
see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953); the Civil Rights Act, see Utley v. Goldman Sachs &
Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989); RICO claims, see Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook
& Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 298-300 (1st Cir. 1986); ERISA claims, see Barrowclough v. Kid-
der, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 941 (3d Cir. 1985); bankruptcy matters, see Zimmerman v.
Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1983); the antitrust laws, see American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire, 391 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir. 1968); patents, see Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970); and the Commodities Ex-
change Act, see Breyer v. First Nat’l Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D.N.J. 1982); see
also Ware, supra note 7, at 713-14 (collecting cases).
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Act lists only four grounds upon which an arbitral ruling may be va-
cated, all of which turn on corruption,32 fraud,33 or arbitrator misbe-
havior.34 In addition, there are three grounds on which courts may
modify or correct an award, but these require a mistake,35 an award
on a matter not submitted to the arbitrator,36 or an award that is “im-
perfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the contro-
versy.”37 The New York Convention imposes on courts a similar obli-
gation to recognize and enforce awards, subject to a similarly narrow
set of exceptions.38
Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and subsequent
arbitral awards opens the door to abuse by arbitrators and the parties
to arbitrations. Because there is only minimal judicial oversight of ar-
bitration, arbitrators may choose to ignore rules of law that are in-
tended to be mandatory. If the use of arbitration were restricted to
traditional private law disputes, as was generally the case through the
1960s,39 the risk of misconduct would be small because such disputes
are typically (though not exclusively) governed by default rules rather
than mandatory rules. When arbitration is also used to settle disputes
32. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (1994); see also Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. v. Motor
Tank Vessel, Akti, 438 F. Supp. 153, 160 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (“To constitute evident partiality,
some overt misconduct or demonstration of partiality is required.”).
33. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1); see also Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement &
Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that, in order to vacate an arbitra-
tion award on the basis of fraud, a movant must show “that the fraud was (1) not discoverable
upon the exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration, (2) materially related to an issue in
the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and convincing evidence”).
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)-(4); see also Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local 1115 Joint
Bd., 377 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that the refusal of an arbitrator to grant
the requested adjournment when the arbitrator was clearly aware of the bona fide and serious
illness of a party’s key witness was sufficient to vitiate the arbitrator’s award); Riko Enters. v.
Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (vacating the award granted by
a commissioner of a professional basketball league who was acting as an arbitrator where testi-
mony showed that he “conducted no hearing and did not allow . . . [the party charged] to submit
any evidence to rebut the charges”).
35. See 9 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1994).
36. See id. § 11(b).
37. Id. § 11(c).
38. The Convention provides that recognition and enforcement of an award may be re-
fused if the arbitration agreement is not valid under the applicable law, if there was a lack of
notice, if the dispute did not fall within the terms of the submission to arbitration, if the compo-
sition of the arbitral authority or procedure was not in accordance with the law or the arbitra-
tion agreement, if the award has been set aside, if the dispute was inarbitrable, or if recognition
of the award would be contrary to public policy. See New York Convention, supra note 17, art.
V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42.
39. See infra note 41.
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implicating traditional public law issues, however, there is a greater
risk that mandatory laws will be implicated and that arbitrators will
choose not to enforce those laws. The next section presents two im-
portant examples of how the courts have expanded the concept of ar-
bitrability to include public law issues.
C. The Expanding Boundaries of Arbitrability
As previously mentioned, arbitration historically has been a dis-
pute resolution mechanism for transactions that implicate only pri-
vate law.40 Public law disputes were left within the exclusive domain
of courts.41 In recent years, however, courts have expanded the cate-
gory of arbitrable disputes to include issues that are normally consid-
ered questions of public law and that previously had been inarbitra-
ble. This section provides a brief description of two areas in which
this expansion has been both dramatic and controversial—securities
and antitrust.
1. Arbitration of Claims Under the Securities Laws. A discussion
of the arbitrability of securities laws in the United States must start
with Wilko v. Swan.42 In that case, the plaintiff brought suit in federal
district court against the partners in a securities brokerage firm,
alleging violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.43 The
essence of the claim was that the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to
purchase shares in a company called Air Associates, Inc. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants had made false representations regarding
the future value of the shares and had failed to disclose that a director
of Air Associates was selling his own stock.44
The defendants in the suit moved to stay the trial pursuant to the
FAA,45 relying on an arbitration agreement signed by the parties at
the time of the sale of the securities. The question before the court
was whether securities disputes were arbitrable. The main legal justi-
fication for determining that the issue was inarbitrable was language
from the Securities Act stating that “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
40. See Davitz, supra note 7, at 62-63.
41. See Park, supra note 7, at 636-37.
42. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
43. See id. at 428.
44. See id. at 429.
45. See id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994) (providing for a stay of court proceedings where the
issue is deemed referable to arbitration).
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provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regula-
tions of the Commission shall be void.”46
The question for the court, therefore, was whether an agreement
to arbitrate future disputes was such a condition—one that would
waive compliance with one or more provisions of the Securities Act.
The district court concluded that such disputes were not amenable to
arbitration,47 but its decision was subsequently reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.48 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.49
The Supreme Court held that disputes under the Securities Act
were not arbitrable, concluding that “the right to select the judicial
forum [including arbitration] is the kind of ‘provision’ that cannot be
waived under section 14 of the Securities Act.”50 The Court reasoned
that the Securities Act was drafted in order to protect buyers of secu-
rities who have less opportunity to investigate the securities than do
the sellers and who, therefore, are at a disadvantage. In giving up his
right to a court proceeding, the buyer “surrenders one of the advan-
tages the [Securities] Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when
he is less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act
places upon his adversary.”51
The Wilko opinion suggests that one of the concerns of the Court
was the ability of the arbitrators to apply mandatory rules accurately:
[T]heir award may be made without explanation of their reasons and
without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators’ con-
ception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as “bur-
den of proof,” “reasonable care” or “material fact,” cannot be ex-
amined. . . . While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators
to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act
would “constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to sec-
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994).
47. See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev’d, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.),
rev’d, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
48. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.), rev’d, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (stating that
the congressional policy of protecting investors, reflected in the Securities Act of 1933, did not
override a congressional policy favoring arbitration, evidenced in the FAA, particularly when
the parties so agreed).
49. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
50. Id. at 435.
51. Id.
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tion 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,” that failure would need to
be made clearly to appear.52
This statement by the Court foreshadows many of the criticisms
that would later be leveled against the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,53 the most
prominent case in the debate surrounding mandatory rules and arbi-
tration.54
Although Wilko appeared to provide a clear and binding prece-
dent on the arbitrability question as applied to securities, the issue
was once again before the Court some twenty years later in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co.55 Unlike Wilko, Scherk dealt with an international
securities transaction. A German plaintiff, Scherk, agreed to sell his
business to an American company, Alberto-Culver. Alberto-Culver
later filed suit in U.S. district court, alleging that Scherk had violated
antifraud rules contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the SEC regulations.56 Scherk re-
sponded with a motion to dismiss, relying on, among other argu-
ments, the existence of an arbitration clause calling for arbitration in
Paris under International Chamber of Commerce rules.57
Following Wilko v. Swan, the district court rejected Scherk’s mo-
tion to dismiss.58 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, also citing Wilko.59
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished Wilko and upheld the
arbitration clause.60 The key difference between the cases, according
to the Court, was that the Scherk case involved a “truly international
agreement.”61 In the absence of an arbitration clause or some other
choice-of-forum clause, the Court reasoned, parties to international
transactions of this type cannot be certain of the law that will apply.
52. Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
53. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
54. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
55. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
56. See id. at 509.
57. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1973), rev’d, 417 U.S. 506
(1974).
58. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
59. See Scherk, 484 F.2d at 619.
60. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20 (“We hold that the agreement of the parties . . . to arbi-
trate any dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction is to be respected and
enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act.”).
Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Douglas wrote a dissent, in which Jus-
tices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined. See id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 515.
GUZMAN TO PRINTER (FINAL).DOC 09/21/00 12:59 PM
1294 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1279
Choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses, therefore, are necessary
to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the transaction.62 The Court
further observed, “A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frus-
trate these purposes [of orderliness and predictability], but would in-
vite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to se-
cure tactical litigation advantages.”63
The Scherk decision opened the door to the arbitration of inter-
national securities transactions. Resistance to arbitration in domestic
transactions was eventually abandoned in the late 1980s. In Shear-
son/American Express v. McMahon,64 the Supreme Court permitted
arbitration of a domestic securities dispute, reasoning that arbitration
represents merely a choice of forum and that “there is no reason to
assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law.”65 The
McMahon Court stopped short of overruling Wilko, but the Court
took this final step in 1989, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express.66 By 1990, therefore, there was no serious
doubt that securities disputes were arbitrable and that courts should
enforce arbitration agreements as well as arbitral awards.67
62. See id. at 518. The Court also included language suggesting that the United States must
become more flexible in dealing with international issues: “We cannot have trade and com-
merce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts.” Id. at 519.
63. Id. at 516.
64. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
65. Id. at 232.
66. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
67. The most recent developments in the area of party choice in securities have dealt more
explicitly with the choice-of-law question. In a series of cases involving Lloyd’s of London, vari-
ous circuit courts have ruled that choice-of-law provisions will sometimes be upheld. Although
the precise test varies from circuit to circuit, the Second Circuit’s test is representative. In Roby
v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit held that forum-
selection and choice-of-law clauses are presumptively valid and that to overcome this presump-
tion “it is not enough that the foreign law or procedure be different or less favorable than that
of the United States. Instead, the question is whether the application of the foreign law presents
a danger that the Roby Names ‘will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly.’” Id. at 1363
(internal citations omitted). Similar holdings have come out of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d
1285 (11th Cir. 1998); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); Haynsworth
v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir.
1996); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3
F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.
1992).
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2. Arbitration of Antitrust Claims. Although securities
regulation is the backdrop for several important arbitrability
decisions, the single most influential case for the purposes of this
Article, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
dealt with an antitrust issue. In 1979, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
(“Soler”) entered into a distributor agreement with Chrysler
International, S.A. (“CISA”) for the sale of Mitsubishi-manufactured
vehicles within a specified area.68 On the same day, Soler, CISA, and
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (“Mitsubishi”) entered into a sales
agreement providing for the sale of Mitsubishi products to Soler.
Included in the sales agreement was an arbitration clause providing
for arbitration, in Japan, of all disputes between Soler and Mitsubishi
under the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.69
Although the relationship proved profitable for a short time, by
1981 the parties were at odds, and Mitsubishi filed a petition in fed-
eral district court seeking an order compelling arbitration. Soler coun-
terclaimed against both Mitsubishi and CISA, alleging violations of
the Sherman Act.70
The question before the court was whether a federal antitrust
claim arising from an international transaction was arbitrable. In the
eyes of the district court, which relied on Scherk, the international na-
ture of the transaction required enforcement of the arbitration
agreement, even as to the federal antitrust claims.71 The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit reversed the district court with respect to
the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims, holding that Soler’s coun-
terclaims were not arbitrable.72 In support of its holding, the court
cited American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,73 which at
the time was the leading case on the question of arbitrability of anti-
trust claims. Among the reasons the American Safety court advanced
for the inarbitrability of antitrust claims was the fact that “[a] claim
under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. . . . [T]he
68. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 617 (1985).
On the arbitrability of domestic antitrust claims, see Syscomm Int’l Corp. v. Synoptics Commu-
nications, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that antitrust claims arising from do-
mestic transactions are arbitrable).
69. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617.
70. See id. at 617-20; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
71. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 621.
72. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 162 (1st
Cir. 1983), rev’d 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
73. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), cited in Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 162.
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plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a pri-
vate attorney-general who protects the public’s interest.”74 In addition
to accepting the public policy claims of American Safety, the circuit
court in Mitsubishi had to reconcile its decision with the obligations of
the United States under the New York Convention. It did so by in-
terpreting the New York Convention’s requirement that each con-
tracting state recognize arbitration agreements “concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration” to imply a public policy
exception.75
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
“whether an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve
antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an in-
ternational transaction.”76 The Court noted the strong presumption,
established by the FAA, in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements,
and it cited Scherk for the proposition that there is also a strong judi-
cial presumption in favor of forum-selection clauses.77 The Court also
noted the accession of the United States to the New York Convention
to underscore the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements in
international transactions.78
Over a strong dissent,79 the majority held that the arbitration
clause must be enforced, concluding that “concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign . . . tribunals, and sensi-
tivity to the need of the international commercial system for predict-
ability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the par-
ties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.”80 Thus, antitrust disputes, like se-
curities disputes, are considered arbitrable, at least when they arise
within an international transaction. The Court noted, however, that
74. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826.
75. New York Convention, supra note 17, art. II(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38
(emphasis added); see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
76. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 164-66.
77. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631. The Court also cited The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), to support the claim that forum-selection clauses are to be enforced. See
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629-30.
78. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631:
Scherk establish[ed] a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely negoti-
ated contractual choice-of-forum provisions . . . . [T]hat presumption is reinforced by
the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution. At least since this
Nation’s accession in 1970 to the Convention . . . that federal policy applies with spe-
cial force in the field of international commerce.
79. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
80. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
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where the arbitration agreement includes claims under U.S. antitrust
law, “the tribunal . . . should be bound to decide that dispute in ac-
cord with the national law giving rise to the claim.”81
The difficulty with the Court’s position, of course, is that there is
no guarantee that the arbitrators will, in fact, apply U.S. antitrust laws
to the dispute. Recognizing the problem, the Court attempted to ex-
plain its position in the much debated and criticized “footnote 19,”
which reads in part:
We therefore have no occasion to speculate on [the choice-of-law]
matter at this stage in the proceedings, when Mitsubishi seeks to en-
force the agreement to arbitrate, not to enforce an award. Nor need
we consider now the effect of an arbitral tribunal’s failure to take
cognizance of the statutory cause of action on the claimant’s capac-
ity to reinitiate suit in federal court. We merely note that in the
event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory
remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy.82
The footnote has been criticized for its failure to provide guid-
ance to future courts regarding the enforceability of arbitration
clauses in antitrust cases.83 On the one hand, it indicates that arbitra-
tors are to be given the benefit of the doubt and that arbitration
agreements should be enforced. On the other hand, it indicates that
such agreements will not be enforced when they represent a “pro-
spective waiver” of U.S. law.
II.  INCENTIVES UNDER THE STATUS QUO
This part undertakes an analysis of the incentives of both the
parties to a transaction and the arbitrator, demonstrating that both
have an incentive to treat mandatory rules as default rules. In addi-
tion, it shows that judicial review—whether the existing form or one
81. Id. at 636-37.
82. Id. at 637 n.19.
83. See id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The plain language of this statute encompasses
claims that arise out of its contract . . . but does not encompass a claim arising under federal
law. . . . Nothing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor its legislative history, suggests that Congress
intended to authorize the arbitration of any statutory claims.”); Joseph D. Becker, Antitrust and
International Arbitration—The New American Synthesis, INT’L BUS. LAW., Nov. 1985, at 447
(“The Court’s acceptance of the propositions that foreign arbitrators will respect treble damage
claims, that they will enforce American antitrust law where applicable, and that their omissions
may be corrected at the award enforcement stage will strike some as so much Micawberism.”).
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of the potential alternatives—fails to deal with the problem of manda-
tory rules in arbitration. Arbitration, coupled with limited judicial re-
view, frustrates the intent of lawmakers to make certain legal rules
mandatory.84
A. The Parties to the Transaction
Consider first the incentives of the parties to the transaction.
Once the parties agree, in principle, to complete a transaction, their
primary objective is to reduce its costs. Doing so allows them to in-
crease the joint gains of the transaction, which can then be divided
between them.85 To this end, they select not only the terms of the ex-
change, such as sales price and delivery terms, but also, to the extent
they are able, the law to be applied and the forum in which disputes
are to be settled. One of the options available to the parties is a con-
tract clause calling for the settlement of disputes before an arbitrator
rather than a court.86 If the parties select arbitration, they are also
able to select a variety of procedural rules, including a mechanism for
the selection of an arbitrator.
To the extent that the parties are able to choose the rules of the
arbitration, including the identity of the arbitrator, they will again
make the cost-minimizing choice. If they are able, through a careful
selection of an arbitrator, to avoid a mandatory rule whose costs to
the parties exceed its benefits, they will do so. Note that because the
parties seek to minimize their joint costs, even rules that offer one of
them substantial benefits will be avoided if the joint costs of the rule
outweigh its benefits. To see why this is so, consider the following ex-
ample.
Example. Imagine a securities transaction between two parties: an
investor who is a U.S. resident and an issuer that is a British firm.
Assume that the transaction falls under the jurisdictional reach of
the antifraud rules contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
84. See generally Ware, supra note 7, at 703 (arguing that arbitration has made many man-
datory rules de facto default rules).
85. There are a variety of reasons why one or more parties to a transaction may not seek to
minimize transactions costs. These include, for example, hold-up opportunities, reputational
concerns, and strategic behavior. I put these issues aside in the interests of simplicity. Including
them would not affect the general point that parties will choose arbitration when it offers them
some ex ante advantage over a judicial resolution of their disputes.
86. See Hylton, supra note 9.
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change Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.87 For the investor, the protection
of U.S. antifraud rules has value because it reduces the risk she
bears when she invests in the security. For simplicity, assume that
she values the protection of these rules at $100. For the issuer, on
the other hand, exposure to these antifraud rules represents a cost.
If these rules apply to the transaction, the issuer faces potential li-
ability, not only for meritorious suits should it commit fraud, but
also for strike suits.88 Assume that these antifraud rules represent a
cost of $150 to the issuer. Suppose that the application of the
antifraud rules can be avoided through the use of arbitration.89
When the issuer and investor negotiate the terms of their transac-
tion,90 the investor will be willing to accept an arbitration agreement
that includes a waiver of her right to remedies under Rule 10b-5
only if she is compensated. To get her to consent to arbitration, the
issuer will have to provide compensation that is at least equal to the
$100 value she places on the protection of the antifraud rules. Be-
cause the cost imposed on the issuer exceeds the benefits the rules
provide to the investor, it is worthwhile for the issuer to offer suffi-
cient compensation to get the investor’s consent to arbitration. By
offering some amount between $100 and $150, the issuer can get the
consent of the investor to arbitration and a waiver of the antifraud
rules. The arbitration agreement reduces the total costs of the trans-
action, and the transfer ensures that both parties are better off.
The above discussion and example demonstrate that the parties
will seek, at the time of contracting, to avoid any rule that imposes a
net cost. After a dispute arises, however, the interests of the parties
may change. A party that consented to a waiver of a mandatory rule
87. For a discussion of the reach of the U.S. antifraud rules, see Stephen J. Choi & Andrew
T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Laws, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 207, 215-19 (1996).
88. See generally James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (presenting empirical evidence
that most securities fraud class actions are strike suits).
89. See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (2d Cir. 1993). In that
case, an arbitration agreement was signed between “Names” (investors) and “Member’s
Agents” (investor representatives within Lloyd’s). See id. at 1358. The arbitration agreement
called for the application of English law, despite the fact that some of the Names were Ameri-
can and that “mandatory” U.S. securities laws would apply absent the arbitration clause. See id.
The Second Circuit found the arbitration clause, including the choice-of-law portion, to be en-
forceable. See id. at 1366.
90. In a public issue, of course, the issuer and the investor rarely negotiate directly. Never-
theless, there is a form of implicit negotiation inasmuch as the issuer chooses the terms on which
it is prepared to offer the securities and the investor chooses whether to accept those terms. Be-
cause the issuer wants the highest possible price for its securities, it will seek to provide terms
that suit the needs of the investor.
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at the time of contracting may wish to have that rule applied once a
dispute arises. In other words, a party may be prepared to contract
out of a rule ex ante, but, once a dispute arises, the party may seek to
revoke her waiver of rights. Because both parties recognize that one
of them may wish to revoke a waiver of rights after a dispute arises,
the initial waiver will be valuable to the parties only if it is irrevocable
and enforceable.91 Prior to the FAA, agreements to arbitrate were
revocable.92 When a dispute arose, either party could revoke its
agreement to arbitrate and demand a judicial resolution of the dis-
pute. In that environment, agreements to arbitrate had little value be-
cause both parties recognized that the agreement did not represent a
credible commitment. Thus, an attempt to avoid a mandatory rule
through the use of arbitration will only succeed if (i) the agreement to
arbitrate is enforced by a court, (ii) the arbitrator is willing to ignore
the mandatory law in question, and (iii) the arbitral award can subse-
quently be enforced over objections from the losing party. This point
is illustrated in the following example.
Example. Returning to the previous example, the investor may be
prepared to waive the protections of the antifraud rules in exchange
for some compensation at the time of contracting, but should a dis-
pute arise in which the investor can profit from application of the
antifraud rules, she will seek to have them applied. In other words, if
she is permitted to do so, she will revoke her earlier waiver. Because
the waiver of the antifraud rules was achieved through an arbitration
clause, the investor may seek to avoid the arbitration. If this fails,
she may try to get the arbitrator to apply the supposedly mandatory
antifraud rules, in contravention of the original intent of the parties.
If this too fails, she can try to prevent the enforcement of the award
by a court. If it is known that these avenues are all foreclosed to the
investor, her original commitment to accept arbitration as a mecha-
nism to waive the antifraud rules is credible, and the issuer will be
willing to offer her compensation for doing so. If, on the other hand,
it is known that she will be able to avoid arbitration, get the arbitra-
tor to apply the mandatory rules, or prevent enforcement of the
award, her initial agreement to waive the antifraud rules through ar-
91. The waiver need not be fully enforceable, but it must be enforceable at least some of
the time. A waiver that is enforced some, but not all, of the time is valuable to the parties be-
cause it allows them to avoid the relevant mandatory rules with some probability. Given that the
parties wish to avoid these rules, they prefer a waiver that avoids the rules some of the time to
one that never does so.
92. See supra Part I.B.
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bitration will not be credible, and the issuer will be unwilling to offer
her compensation for her agreement to arbitrate.
Under existing law, when a party consents to have future dis-
putes settled through arbitration, she waives her right to demand that
such disputes be litigated before a court. The FAA instructs courts to
enforce arbitration agreements, thereby closing the courthouse doors
to a party that has consented to arbitration of an arbitrable claim.93
Similarly, the FAA places strict limits on the ability of a court to over-
turn an arbitral award.94 Finally, courts are reluctant to conduct a de-
tailed review of arbitral awards.95 From the point of view of the par-
ties, the law makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable and
irrevocable and permits the enforcement of arbitral awards. There-
fore, as long as the parties can find a cooperative arbitrator, they will
be able to reduce the cost of their transaction through an arbitration
agreement that includes a waiver of mandatory rules that impose a
net cost on the transaction.
B. The Arbitrator
Now consider the incentives of arbitrators. In at least some cor-
ners, it is believed that arbitrators have a duty to apply mandatory
rules. For example, the Mitsubishi Court stated that arbitrators have
an obligation to resolve disputes according to national laws.96 In addi-
tion, commentators have from time to time observed that arbitrators
must not only be neutral as between the parties, but also must not fa-
vor the intent of the parties over nonwaivable requirements of public
law.97 The academic literature, however, has rarely addressed the
93. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (“A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”); id. § 4 (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure,
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition
[a] United States district court which . . . . shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”).
94. See id. § 10.
95. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634-38
(1985) (“[T]he efficacy of [the] arbitral process requires that substantial review at the award en-
forcement stage remain minimal . . . .”).
96. See id. at 636-37.
97. See, e.g., von Mehren, Future of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 627 (“[E]specially in the
public law area arbitrators should not be advocates for the position of those who appoint
them.”); Detlev Vagts, National Legal Systems and Private Dispute Resolution, 82 AM. J. INT’L
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question of whether it is reasonable to expect arbitrators to respect
mandatory laws.98 If arbitrators, indeed, have sufficient incentive to
apply these rules, the problem of mandatory rules in arbitration
largely disappears. Once a dispute reaches arbitration, the mandatory
law in question will be put before the arbitrator by the party that
stands to benefit from its application.99 Disputes will be resolved in
accordance with the law, the parties will get the benefits of arbitra-
tion, and there will be no conflict between mandatory rules and arbi-
tration. Furthermore, if arbitrators consistently apply mandatory
rules, efforts to avoid mandatory rules through an agreement to arbi-
trate will fail—eliminating the incentive to make such agreements.100
In order to understand the behavior of arbitrators, it is helpful to
begin by noting that although the arbitrator performs a task that re-
sembles that of a judge, there are critical differences between judges
and arbitrators. Despite the resemblance between arbitration pro-
ceedings and court proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that
the former is the result of a private contract while the latter arises
from the state’s authority to resolve disputes and to compel compli-
L. 616, 620 (1988) (reviewing INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK (J.
Stewart McClendon & Rosabel E. Everard Goodman eds., 1986)):
Increasingly, arbitrators face a double bind: whether to give effect to the will of the
parties, or to protect the reputation of the arbitral process by refusing to let it be used
to evade the mandatory norms of a country with a vital interest in the subject matter
of the dispute.
98. See Posner, supra note 7, at 664 (“The arbitrators face a collective action problem: they
are better off if all respect the mandatory rule, but each has an incentive to deviate.”).
99. It is possible that in a particular dispute neither party wishes to have the mandatory
rule apply and that it will never be raised. This problem, however, is not unique to arbitration.
In a judicial proceeding, the court relies on the parties to raise arguments, and it will normally
consider only those issues raised by one of the parties. Where mandatory laws are also enforced
by administrative agencies, of course, these agencies may challenge compliance with a manda-
tory rule, but the behavior of such agencies is not relevant to the current discussion. It is also
possible that arbitrators are simply less qualified or less capable in the application of mandatory
rules than are judges. This concern, however, goes beyond the scope of this Article. If arbitra-
tors are less qualified than judges, this represents an independent reason to oppose the arbitra-
bility of mandatory rules.
100. To be sure, this reasoning assumes that arbitrators are competent to apply mandatory
laws. Although the Supreme Court has expressed some skepticism about the abilities of arbitra-
tors, see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (rec-
ognizing the need for arbitrators to disclose any dealing that might create an impression of pos-
sible bias); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that nonlawyer arbitrators are “wholly unqualified to decide legal issues”);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (implying that arbitrators’ analysis of statutory re-
quirements may be less precise than desired), the extent to which arbitrators are permitted to
interpret these laws under the current regime suggests that courts and legislators are satisfied
that arbitrators can indeed apply these laws correctly.
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ance. As private actors, arbitrators perform their function for private
gain. Whether the private reward they seek is solely financial or a
combination of financial compensation, prestige, and influence over
events is immaterial. The analysis presented here requires only that
the objectives of the arbitrator be furthered by an increase in the
number of cases she handles.
Assuming that arbitrators seek to increase the number of arbitral
panels on which they sit and that arbitration associations seek to at-
tract business, arbitrators and arbitration associations will seek to de-
velop reputations for providing the type of arbitration services that
their potential clients want. When arbitrators are faced with a choice
between applying mandatory rules and ignoring those rules in favor
of the arbitration agreement, reputational concerns will cause arbitra-
tors to favor the latter because an arbitrator who is able to establish a
reputation for honoring the arbitration agreement will be more ap-
pealing to the parties.
To understand the role of an arbitrator’s reputation for enforcing
the terms of an arbitration agreement, it is important to understand
the process by which arbitrators are appointed. As a general matter,
the manner in which arbitrators are appointed is within the control of
the parties. The agreement to arbitrate can specify almost any proce-
dure. The most popular method for appointing arbitrators to an arbi-
tral panel in international disputes is for each side to appoint one ar-
bitrator, with a third arbitrator appointed either by the two selected
arbitrators or by the arbitration association (or another appointing
authority). The arbitration association also selects the third member
of the panel in the event that the two chosen members cannot agree
on a selection.101 If the arbitration is to be conducted by a single arbi-
trator rather than by a panel, either the parties agree on the arbitra-
tor, or the association (or the appointing authority) selects the arbi-
trator. Virtually all schemes for appointment of arbitrators specify the
appointment procedures in the arbitration agreement. As is true of
other aspects of the transaction, these procedures will be chosen at
the time of contracting, and the parties will seek to minimize their
costs. Therefore, if a mandatory rule is costly to the parties, they will
structure the procedures for the selection of arbitrators such that their
101. See International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration art. 8(4); UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules art. 7(3); International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation art. 6(3). But see London Court of International Arbitration art. 5.5 (“The LCIA Court
alone is empowered to appoint arbitrators.”).
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attempt to avoid a mandatory rule succeeds. They will choose a pro-
cedure designed to yield an arbitrator or arbitral panel with a reputa-
tion for enforcing the terms of an arbitration agreement, even when
this involves overlooking mandatory laws.
Consider the above procedure for selecting arbitrators, in which
each party selects one arbitrator and the two chosen arbitrators agree
upon a third. If the two cannot agree upon a third, the appointing
authority selects the third arbitrator. If the parties choose this mecha-
nism for the selection of arbitrators, they will also have to choose an
appointing authority. When making the choice of appointing author-
ity, the parties can ensure that their wish to avoid the mandatory rule
will be respected simply by specifying an appointing authority with a
reputation for selecting arbitrators who enforce the arbitration
agreement according to its terms. To see why this is so, return again
to our example.102
Example. Imagine that an issuer sells securities to an investor in an
international securities offering. The parties agree upon and sign an
arbitration agreement under which section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 would not apply to the transac-
tion, despite the fact that they are mandatory U.S. laws. The agree-
ment also specifies the arbitration association that is to handle the
arbitration and act as appointing authority. Suppose that after the
transaction has taken place a dispute arises in which the investor ar-
gues that the issuer engaged in fraudulent representations and
makes claims under Rule 10b-5. The issuer hopes that the arbitrator
will ignore Rule 10b-5—a mandatory rule under the securities
laws—while the investor hopes the rule will be applied. The arbitral
panel is to be made up of one arbitrator selected by each party and a
third selected by the two chosen arbitrators or, if they cannot agree,
by the arbitration association.
Suppose that at the time they sign the arbitration agreement the
parties have a choice between two arbitration associations, A and B.
Arbitration association A has a reputation for enforcing mandatory
laws when they apply to a transaction. Association B, on the other
hand, has a reputation for strictly enforcing the arbitration agree-
ment, even when doing so is contrary to a mandatory law. If the par-
ties choose association A, then the investor can ensure that the
antifraud rules are applied by selecting an arbitrator who not only
will apply mandatory rules, but will accept only those proposed third
102. See supra Part II.A.
GUZMAN TO PRINTER (FINAL).DOC 09/21/00 12:59 PM
2000] ARBITRATOR LIABILITY 1305
arbitrators known to apply mandatory rules. Because a failure by
the arbitrators appointed by the parties to agree on a third causes
association A to appoint the third, and because association A has a
reputation for appointing arbitrators that enforce mandatory laws,
the investor is confident that two of the three arbitrators will enforce
the antitrust rules.103 If, on the other hand, association B is selected,
it is the issuer who has the advantage. By appointing an arbitrator
who is prepared to enforce the arbitration agreement rather than the
antifraud rules and who demands that the third arbitrator do the
same, the issuer ensures that the mandatory rule will not be applied.
Now, consider which association the parties will choose. Recall
that, at the time the arbitration agreement is signed, both parties
want to waive the application of the antifraud rules. The investor
wants to be able to make a binding commitment in order to make
the waiver credible. A credible waiver will induce the issuer to offer
compensation that exceeds the value the investor places on the
antifraud rules. The issuer will refuse to offer any compensation for
a noncredible waiver. If association A is chosen, the commitment to
waive the antifraud rules is not credible because, as we have seen,
the investor can ensure that the antifraud rules will be applied
should a dispute arise. If, on the other hand, association B is chosen,
the waiver is credible because the issuer can ensure that the arbitral
tribunal ignores the mandatory antifraud rules. In order to make the
waiver credible, therefore, the parties will select arbitration associa-
tion B.
As this example demonstrates, although the parties’ selection of
arbitrators will be made after the dispute has arisen, that selection
will be made in the shadow of the appointing authority. By choosing
an appointing authority with a reputation for enforcing arbitration
agreements according to their terms, the parties make the waiver of
mandatory rules credible. Of course, arbitration associations under-
stand the incentives facing the parties. In order to attract business,
they will seek a reputation for enforcing arbitration agreements, even
when this means ignoring mandatory national laws. In order to de-
velop such a reputation, arbitration associations will seek out individ-
ual arbitrators who are prepared to ignore mandatory laws. They will
also adopt rules that favor the application of rules chosen by the par-
103. Furthermore, even the party that would prefer to have the mandatory rules applied has
little reason to seek out an arbitrator who will apply those rules, because the battle over manda-
tory rules has already been lost.
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ties rather than mandatory laws. The above forces will, in turn, give
individual arbitrators a strong incentive to ignore mandatory laws,
because doing so makes them more attractive to arbitration associa-
tions.
The theoretical discussion above demonstrates that arbitrators
have a strong incentive to apply the law chosen by the parties in the
arbitration agreement rather than that required by national law. The
available evidence on arbitrator behavior, although largely anecdotal,
provides support for this theoretical claim.104
In one survey, albeit somewhat dated, 90% of the arbitrators
surveyed felt that “they were free to ignore these rules [of substantive
law] whenever they thought that more just decisions would be
reached by doing so.”105 More modern discussions of labor arbitration
similarly conclude that arbitrators believe they should adhere to the
collective bargaining agreement rather than the law.106 Even judges
have recognized that arbitrators are willing to ignore substantive legal
rules. For example, in the securities case Wilko v. Swan,107 the Second
Circuit stated that “arbitrators do not ordinarily consider themselves
bound to decide strictly according to legal rules.”108 Although the
above evidence is from surveys of domestic, rather than international,
arbitrators, there is no reason to think that the latter are more likely
to apply mandatory laws than are the former. In fact, one would ex-
pect exactly the opposite. Because international transactions impli-
cate the laws of many countries, it is often argued that choice-of-law
clauses should be more readily approved for these transactions than
for their domestic counterparts.109 In the international context, arbi-
104. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Ware, supra note 7, at 719-25 (collect-
ing empirical evidence that arbitrators feel free to ignore the law).
105. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961).
106. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 636 (2d ed. 1996).
107. 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.), rev’d, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
108. See id. at 444; see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744
(1981) (“Because the arbitrator is required to enforce the intent of the parties, rather than to
effectuate the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies underlying the
[Fair Labor Standards Act], thus depriving an employee of protected statutory rights.”); Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (“[T]he special role of the arbitrator . . . is
to enforce the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation.”).
109. See Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-17 (1974) (recognizing that the
conflicts-of-law problems that will almost inevitably exist in international agreements weigh in
favor of supporting contractual provisions specifying in advance the forum and applicable law);
Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Forum selection and
choice-of-law clauses eliminate uncertainty in international commerce and insure that the par-
ties are not unexpectedly subjected to hostile forums and laws.”).
GUZMAN TO PRINTER (FINAL).DOC 09/21/00 12:59 PM
2000] ARBITRATOR LIABILITY 1307
trators may be even more prepared to ignore mandatory laws in order
to apply the law selected by the parties.110
C. The Impact of Judicial Review
Up to this point, the discussion has assumed that judicial review
plays no role in the arbitral process. The preceding sections have
shown that, without judicial intervention, both the parties to the
transaction and the arbitrator have an incentive to ignore mandatory
rules. This section considers the impact of judicial review on the par-
ties, concluding that it fails to change the incentives of either the par-
ties to the transaction or the arbitrators. Judicial support for arbitra-
tion and deference to arbitral rulings rely on a presumption that
arbitrators will apply the same substantive law as would domestic
courts.111 As shown in Section II.B, however, this presumption is mis-
placed because arbitrators have an incentive to favor the arbitration
agreement over mandatory laws. Therefore, if the legal system is to
prevent arbitrator misconduct, it must monitor the behavior of arbi-
trators in some way. Failure to provide sufficient monitoring will
cause many supposedly mandatory rules to become default rules.
Under existing U.S. law, courts have two opportunities to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a case that purports to be governed by an arbi-
tration clause. The first of these occurs if one of the parties claims
that the case should be decided by a court rather than an arbitral tri-
bunal. That is, one of the parties may initiate judicial proceedings be-
fore the arbitration takes place. At that time, the court may conclude
that arbitration is inappropriate under the circumstances and may
take jurisdiction over the case rather than compel arbitration.112 The
110. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 338
(1993):
If the [arbitration] agreement contains a choice-of-law clause, it is virtually always
followed. For one thing, international arbitration is part of the tradition of party
autonomy that includes the freedom to choose a forum and to choose the law to gov-
ern their relations; for another, arbitrators owe their jurisdiction to the agreement of
the parties, and the choice-of-law clause is a condition of that agreement.
111. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985)
([T]he [arbitral] tribunal . . . should be bound to decide [disputes] in accord with the national
law giving rise to the claim[s]”); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 1 (“Honest arbitrators do
not manifestly disregard the law.”).
112. Under the New York Convention and the FAA, however, courts are to force arbitra-
tion upon parties that have contracted for it and who are involved in an arbitrable dispute. See
New York Convention, supra note 14, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38, 40; 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1994).
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second opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over the case occurs when
the winner seeks to enforce the arbitral ruling. At that point, the
court may consider whether the arbitrator complied with the arbitra-
tion agreement and whether he applied the relevant mandatory
laws—even if the parties agreed ex ante that such laws should not ap-
ply. These two mechanisms for ensuring that arbitrators apply manda-
tory laws—challenges to the arbitration agreement and challenges to
enforcement—leave the court with several possible approaches to the
arbitrability and enforceability questions. Unfortunately, none of the
options currently available to the courts resolves the problem of
mandatory rules and arbitration. This part discusses the possible ap-
proaches.
1. Demanding Evidence That the Arbitrator Will Apply U.S.
Law. The court could refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement
absent some assurance that the arbitrator will apply U.S. law. The
party seeking arbitration might, for example, satisfy the court by
pointing to language in the arbitration agreement that instructs
arbitrators to apply mandatory U.S. law to the dispute. If the party
seeking arbitration cannot make a showing of this sort, the court
would refuse to compel arbitration and would take jurisdiction over
the case. Imagine, for example, an international dispute in which the
laws of both the United States and Great Britain might plausibly
apply. Suppose that there is at least one mandatory U.S. law that
would be applied by a U.S. court but that would not be applied by a
British court. Suppose further that the arbitration agreement states
that the laws of Great Britain are to apply to all disputes. Absent
some showing that the arbitrator would apply the U.S. law, contrary
to the stated wishes of the parties, a U.S. court would take jurisdiction
over the case.
The principal advantage of this approach is that it ensures that
mandatory laws are applied. Along with this benefit come several
drawbacks. First, the strategy undermines the benefits of arbitration.
In the specific case, of course, the advantages of arbitration are lost
because the parties are forced to litigate before a court. More impor-
tantly, however, requiring evidence that the arbitrator will apply
mandatory laws frustrates many of the benefits of arbitration for all
parties—even those that never find themselves in a dispute. If the
availability of arbitration is conditioned on a showing that the arbitra-
tor will apply mandatory laws, few arbitration agreements can be re-
lied upon. Regardless of the content of the agreement, there is a risk
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that a dispute will implicate a mandatory law—either because such a
law is in genuine dispute, or because one party has constructed a
claim under a mandatory law in order to gain access to the courts—
and, as a result, that the arbitration clause will not be enforced. In this
environment, the expected benefits of an arbitration agreement are
dramatically reduced, both because fewer cases are arbitrated and be-
cause there is a lack of certainty regarding the forum that will hear
the dispute. The benefit of certainty and clarity, emphasized by the
Scherk Court,113 is lost.
A second problem with this restrictive approach to arbitration is
that it is overinclusive. Because the intentions of an arbitrator cannot
easily be verified by a court, courts might often refuse to enforce arbi-
tration agreements despite the fact that the arbitrator intends to apply
the mandatory rule. Thus, even cases that do not pose a problem for
the enforcement of mandatory rules will be denied the benefits of ar-
bitration.
Third, this strategy demands that courts (and litigants arguing be-
fore courts) anticipate the full range of issues that will come up in a
given case. Because the question of arbitrability is a preliminary one,
it often will be difficult for anybody to know all the relevant issues
that may be implicated in the case. In order to make even a mildly in-
formed guess about the range of issues at stake, a court must carry
out a detailed examination of the issues. This is especially true when
one party claims that a mandatory rule is implicated and the other
party argues that the rule is not relevant to the dispute. In circum-
stances of this sort, the court must do much more than simply make a
preliminary ruling—it must assess the validity of claims implicating
mandatory laws. Such an inquiry, of course, takes court time and is
costly for the parties. Even if the court eventually refers the parties to
arbitration, merely getting the court to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment is difficult and costly enough to make arbitration less appealing.
Finally, demanding evidence that arbitrators will apply manda-
tory laws is contrary to domestic statutory and case law, and would
compromise international commitments of the United States. A court
refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement must ignore the policies
behind both the FAA and the New York Convention, both of which
favor enforcement of arbitration agreements.114 In addition, the court
113. See infra note 115.
114. See supra note 112; Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974) (“The principal purpose of [the
New York Convention] was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbi-
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must ignore the view of the Supreme Court, as stated in a variety of
cases, that arbitration should be encouraged—especially in interna-
tional transactions.115
2. Reviewing Arbitrators’ Rulings. If courts do not demand
assurances regarding the application of mandatory rules when they
enforce the arbitration agreement, they can revisit the case after the
arbitration is completed and one party seeks to enforce the ruling.
Addressing the application of mandatory laws after the arbitrator has
issued a decision makes it easier to determine whether the mandatory
rules were applied.
If courts are to review arbitral rulings on the question of whether
a mandatory law has been applied, they must determine the standard
of review. United States courts, following Mitsubishi, currently apply
a standard of review that is quite deferential; many commentators,
however, support a higher standard of review.116 The Article now
turns to consider the two polar cases of de novo review and highly
deferential review, demonstrating that both are problematic.
a. De novo review. If the court reviews the arbitral award de
novo, an arbitrator’s ruling that is contrary to a mandatory rule will
be overruled.117 The most significant problem with de novo review is
the risk of bias. It is generally accepted that one of the important
advantages of arbitration in international transactions is the ability to
avoid national courts that are perceived to be biased in favor of local
parties.118 De novo review exposes foreign parties to this bias,
undermining the perceived fairness of the process.
Another problem with de novo review is that it is inconsistent
with existing U.S. law and international obligations. As previously
tration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in signatory countries.”).
115. See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516 (“A contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated . . . is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction.”); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“[I]n the light of
present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.”).
116. See Ware, supra note 7, at 738 n.149 (collecting sources).
117. For simplicity, I assume that courts engaged in de novo review are always able to iden-
tify arbitral misconduct accurately. Without this assumption, the results of the analysis would be
stronger than those presented.
118. See Guzman, Capital Market Regulation, supra note 5, at 634.
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discussed, the FAA provides only very limited grounds on which
courts may vacate or modify an arbitral award.119 None of the permis-
sible grounds for court intervention permits the routine de novo re-
view of arbitral awards.120 Furthermore, requiring de novo review may
represent a breach of U.S. obligations under the New York Conven-
tion. Like the FAA, the Convention provides for only very limited
review of arbitral awards.121 It might be argued that de novo review is
permissible under the public policy exception to the Convention,122
but interpreting the public policy exception in this way is contrary to
current U.S. and international practice. In the United States, for ex-
ample, courts have reviewed arbitral awards quite deferentially, typi-
cally looking only to the question of whether certain basic forms of
procedural fairness were present.123 In any event, as the Mitsubishi
Court recognized, such a broad interpretation of the public policy ex-
ception would undermine the fundamental objectives of the New
York Convention by greatly increasing the cost of enforcing arbitral
awards.124
A common objection to de novo review of arbitral awards is that
it undermines the predictability and cost savings that arbitration pro-
vides.125 A de novo standard leads to a detailed inquiry that is costly
for the parties. De novo review, then, presents the danger that arbi-
119. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
120. Other commentators also have made this point. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disar-
ray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 814
(1996) (asserting that a standard allowing a court to review the merits of an arbitral award “is
not legitimate” and is “inconsistent with the public policy underlying section 10(a) of the
FAA”); Ware, supra note 7, at 737 (“Imposing de novo judicial review, as opposed to allowing
parties to contract into it by requiring the arbitrator to apply the law, may be difficult to recon-
cile with the FAA.”). But see EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 411-12 (1997) (arguing that courts do,
indeed, have the authority to vacate awards when the arbitrator has failed to apply a mandatory
rule).
121. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
122. See New York Convention, supra note 17, art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42 (stating that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may . . . be refused” if
“[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [the
particular jurisdiction]”).
123. See Park, supra note 7, at 644-45 (outlining the grounds upon which a court may refuse
to enforce an arbitral award).
124. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985)
([T]he efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement
stage remain minimal”).
125. See Becker, supra note 83, at 447; Park, supra note 7, at 642; Posner, supra note 7, at
651.
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tration will represent little more than a costly precursor to trial. The
arbitration itself serves no significant purpose because it is the court’s
ruling that ultimately resolves the case. According to this critique, ar-
bitration simply serves to increase the costs of dispute resolution be-
cause it imposes one more level of litigation.
Contrary to the above concern, however, de novo review need
not lead to the costly litigation of each case. If it is known that courts
are prepared to review arbitral decisions de novo, this knowledge will
affect the behavior of the parties and the arbitrator. An arbitration
clause that seeks to avoid a mandatory law might be enforced by an
arbitrator, but both parties would know that such a clause would sub-
sequently be litigated before a court—where the mandatory rule
would be applied. Ultimately, the mandatory law applies, suggesting
that a contrary choice-of-law provision is not credible. As discussed
earlier,126 if the waiver of substantive rights is not credible, it carries
no value. Thus, if arbitration decisions are reviewed de novo, parties
will not seek to avoid mandatory rules, and arbitrators will apply
those rules.
For reasons discussed in more detail in Section III.D.1, a regime
in which arbitrators apply mandatory rules will greatly reduce the
number of cases brought before courts for review. Although individ-
ual cases that go through arbitration only to be reviewed de novo by a
court will lose the benefits of arbitration, the large majority of cases
will not be brought to a court and, therefore, will enjoy the cost sav-
ings and certainty of arbitration.
b. Deferential review. If de novo review is unsatisfactory,
courts can engage in deferential review of arbitral decisions—as they
do under existing law.127 Such review obliges courts to enforce arbitral
awards absent compelling evidence that the arbitrator ignored
mandatory rules. Although this approach reduces the costs of review
for both the court system and the parties, it fails to provide sufficient
supervision of arbitral rulings and, therefore, fails to ensure the
application of mandatory rules.
As an initial matter, note that deferential review is necessarily
underinclusive. In only a small percentage of the cases in which an
arbitrator has ignored mandatory rules will that action be sufficiently
126. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
127. See Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration
Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1998).
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evident for a court to refuse enforcement of the award. Because the
court is able to observe only the final decision of the arbitrator and
whatever written opinion the arbitrator provides, it is extremely diffi-
cult, in all but the simplest cases, to determine whether a particular
mandatory law was applied by the arbitrator. In some cases, arbitral
rulings are issued without any reasoned opinion, making it even more
difficult for a court to conclude, upon a preliminary inspection, that
the arbitrator ignored mandatory rules.128 Indeed, in the United
States, the practice of issuing an award without a reasoned opinion is
often adopted specifically to avoid giving the loser any grounds upon
which to challenge the award.129
From the perspective of the parties, the fact that only a fraction
of arbitral awards ignoring mandatory rules will be refused enforce-
ment by the courts makes it possible to opt out of virtually any man-
datory rule—as long as the parties can find an arbitrator willing to ig-
nore those rules and the arbitrator’s failure to follow the rules is not
obvious.130 Deference to arbitrators, therefore, fails to prevent arbitra-
tion from converting mandatory rules into default rules.131 Although
attempts to avoid mandatory rules will sometimes be frustrated, this
will happen only occasionally. Knowing that in many cases the arbi-
tral ruling will be upheld, parties that wish to avoid mandatory rules
will still have an incentive to have those rules ignored in arbitration,
and arbitrators will be eager to follow the wishes of the parties, as dis-
cussed in Part II. It is true that the risk of a court’s refusing to enforce
128. Written decisions, however, are more common in the international setting than in the
domestic setting. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 120, at 324 (“Only in a few, specialized
types of arbitrations do arbitrators routinely craft written decisions—labor arbitrations, interna-
tional commercial arbitrations, and maritime arbitrations.”); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL.,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 3.2.3, at 3:13 (1994) (noting that arbitrators generally do not
write opinions); 3 id. § 37.4.1, at 37:10 (noting that arbitrators have no obligation under the
FAA “to make findings of fact or conclusions of law, or otherwise to give reasons for their
awards” (footnotes omitted)).
129. The then-president of the American Arbitration Association wrote that reasoned
awards are “dangerous because they identify targets for the losing party to attack.” R.
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 25 (2d ed. 1982); see also
Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Reasoned Awards and Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443,
446-47 (1998) (noting that reasoned awards would increase the likelihood of court challenges to
awards and would also “increas[e] the formality, the cost, and the time to decision in commer-
cial arbitration”).
130. Recall that arbitrators have an incentive to enforce arbitration agreements, even if they
are contrary to mandatory rules. Finding an arbitrator willing to ignore mandatory rules, there-
fore, is unlikely to be difficult.
131. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Ware, supra note 7, at 719-25.
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an arbitral award increases the cost of attempting to avoid mandatory
rules. Rather than bear this cost, some parties may choose to accept
the application of mandatory rules to their disputes. There is, how-
ever, no reason to expect this to affect more than a small number of
marginal transactions. To influence more transactions, courts would
have to conduct a more thorough review and identify a larger share of
those who attempt to avoid mandatory rules. Increasing the level of
review, of course, introduces the problems of de novo review dis-
cussed above. For most transactions, therefore, the possibility of re-
view is unlikely to affect the parties’ choice of arbitration over a court
system or their preference for avoiding the mandatory law.
Turning to the effect on an arbitrator of a court’s refusal to en-
force an award, it is unlikely that the mere risk of reversal can correct
the arbitrator’s incentives. It is true that a reversal may have some
impact on an arbitrator’s reputation, but the reputational effect will
not necessarily lead to greater respect for mandatory rules.132 Reversal
by a court will have two effects on an arbitrator’s reputation. First, an
arbitrator who is reversed may be seen as one who cannot success-
fully “fool” a court into believing that the mandatory rules were ap-
plied when, in fact, they were not. That is, the arbitrator may be seen
as someone who is unable to meet the needs of the parties to the
transaction because he lacks certain skills—in particular, the ability to
deceive a court.133 This reputational effect is bad for the arbitrator, but
only in the sense that the parties to a transaction will look for an arbi-
trator who can more consistently ignore mandatory rules without be-
ing reversed. Rather than increase the likelihood that an arbitrator
will apply mandatory rules, this reputational effect will simply in-
crease the competition among arbitrators willing to ignore mandatory
rules and increase the payoff to those arbitrators who are most adept
at misleading courts.
Second, a reversal may simply indicate that the arbitrator is
willing to overlook mandatory rules when that is the will of the par-
ties, as expressed in their arbitration agreement. Even the most
skilled arbitrators, when they ignore mandatory rules, will occasion-
ally be reversed by the courts. That a particular arbitrator is reversed,
therefore, may signal that she is willing to ignore mandatory rules.
From this perspective, reversal is a sign that an arbitrator is desirable.
132. See Posner, supra note 7, at 651.
133. See id. at 655-56.
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Neither of the reputational effects of a court’s refusal to enforce
an award, therefore, is likely to lead to an increase in the frequency
with which arbitrators apply mandatory rules that the parties seek to
avoid. The problem with judicial review is that it fails to address di-
rectly the problem of arbitrators’ incentives. A court’s refusal to en-
force an award does not impose a direct cost on arbitrators who ig-
nore mandatory rules and, therefore, fails to influence the incentives
of arbitrators. As long as the parties have an ex ante desire to avoid
mandatory rules, arbitrators will try to accommodate those desires
unless they face some offsetting cost when they do so. Although it is
true that arbitrators who ignore mandatory rules may be reversed,
and that those who are bad at hiding their motives from courts will be
reversed more often, both the parties to the transaction and the arbi-
trators will still have an incentive to ignore mandatory rules.
If the risk of judicial review successfully aligned the arbitrator’s
incentives with those of the legal system, the problem of mandatory
rules in arbitration would be solved. In his recent article, Professor
Eric Posner argues that the Mitsubishi Court sought to address the in-
centives of arbitrators.134 Posner presents a model in which courts
choose to enforce arbitral awards in some cases and to review them in
others.135 The choice between enforcing and reviewing is random.
Posner argues that in his model this strategy is optimal because it in-
duces arbitrators to respect mandatory rules in at least some cases.136
Assuming that Posner’s model is correct, and assuming that his mixed
strategy equilibrium is the correct one,137 a mixed strategy outcome
remains less desirable than one in which mandatory rules are fol-
lowed as a matter of course by arbitrators. Thus, even if Posner’s de-
fense of Mitsubishi represents an accurate positive account, one
would prefer, as a normative matter, a different outcome. Part III
demonstrates that arbitrator liability introduces incentives that lead
to an equilibrium in which arbitrators respect mandatory rules in
every case.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 654-68 (describing the model).
136. See id. at 668.
137. Posner accurately points out that there are at least three possible equilibria in his
model. In the first, the “pure arbitration equilibrium,” arbitrators ignore mandatory rules and
courts enforce those rules. See id. at 658-60. In the second, the “no arbitration equilibrium,”
courts try cases de novo, and parties do not use arbitration clauses. See id. In the third, the “par-
tial arbitration equilibrium,” both courts and arbitrators adopt mixed strategies. See id. at 660-
61.
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III.  REALIGNING INCENTIVES
A. Arbitrator Liability
The role of an arbitrator is often analogized to that of a judge.138
Once we have this analogy in mind, we naturally view judicial review
of arbitral decisions as analogous to review of judicial decisions. De-
spite its superficial similarity to a court action, however, an arbitra-
tion proceeding is more properly viewed as the product of contract.
The parties to a transaction contract to arbitrate their disputes, and
the arbitrator—either at the time of contracting or, more likely, after
a dispute arises—contracts with these parties to resolve their dispute.
The contract between the parties and the arbitrator contains
terms—both explicit and implicit—that are negotiated by the parties,
but it also includes certain mandatory terms. For example, all contrac-
tual agreements include the obligation to perform in good faith.139
This duty exists even if it is not specified in the contract, and it cannot
be waived.140 Failure to perform in good faith constitutes a breach of
the contract.141
The use of arbitration can be reconciled with the presence of
mandatory rules by recognizing that the arbitrator and the parties to
the transaction are bound by contract and by imposing on the arbitra-
tor a duty to apply mandatory laws in the performance of his contrac-
tual obligations. Under arbitrator liability, the arbitrator is required
to carry out his responsibilities subject to the requirement that he re-
spect mandatory rules, just as he must carry them out subject to a
duty of good faith. Like the duty of good faith, the duty to enforce
mandatory rules cannot be waived by contract. Failure to apply a
mandatory law constitutes a breach of contract and gives the injured
party—here, the party that would benefit from application of the
mandatory law—the right to sue the arbitrator for that breach. Thus,
a party to an arbitration could file suit against an arbitrator for breach
of contract if the former believed that the latter had ignored a manda-
tory rule and thereby failed to carry out her obligations under the
138. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 7, at 707-08.
139. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (1999) (“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an ob-
ligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”).
140. See id. § 1-102(3) (“[O]bligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care pre-
scribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement . . . .”).
141. See id. § 1-203.
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contract. This suit would be before a court.142 If the court determined
that the arbitrator had failed to apply a mandatory rule, the aggrieved
party would be entitled to damages.
Notice how this proposal alters the structure of incentives. The
arbitrator now faces potential liability for his failure to apply a man-
datory law. As shown below, arbitrator liability encourages the arbi-
trator to apply the mandatory rule in the first place and thereby
avoids the problems associated with the status quo. If damages are set
appropriately,143 arbitrators’ current incentive to ignore mandatory
rules is replaced by an incentive to apply those rules.144
Arbitrator liability also mitigates concerns of judicial bias. If
courts are called upon to resolve disputes between parties, there is a
risk that they will systematically favor their own citizens. Under arbi-
trator liability, the court is faced with a dispute between one of the
parties and the arbitrator. This reduces the risk of bias in several
ways. First, it may be that neither the arbitrator nor the plaintiff is a
local resident or citizen. Suppose, for example, that one of the parties
to a transaction is a U.S. resident while the other is not. The two par-
ties enter into a dispute that goes to arbitration. If a U.S. court re-
views the award, the non-U.S. party may be concerned that the court
will be biased. Under arbitrator liability, on the other hand, the court
will have an opportunity to exercise its purported bias only if the
American party is still involved. If, for example, the U.S. party wins at
the arbitration stage, she will not be directly involved in the suit be-
tween the arbitrator and the other party, and there is no risk of bias.
142. It is conceivable that the parties to the transaction and the arbitrator may want to pro-
vide for arbitration of any issues regarding arbitrator liability. There seems to be no compelling
reason to forbid arbitration in this context, although demanding that such disputes be heard by a
court may encourage finality and prevent the appearance of a conflict of interest as one arbitra-
tor sits in judgment of another’s actions. In any event, this is a secondary issue that will not be
discussed further in this Article.
143. The appropriate measure of damages is discussed in the remaining sections of Part III.
144. One additional point about mandatory rules bears mentioning. An arbitration agree-
ment with a choice-of-law clause that is contrary to mandatory U.S. laws may generate problems
outside the United States if those mandatory laws are applied by an arbitrator. Under the New
York Convention, a court may refuse to enforce an award if the arbitrator decided an issue that
was not included in the arbitration agreement. See New York Convention, supra note 17, art.
V(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42. Thus, an arbitral award that applies U.S. manda-
tory laws even when they are contrary to the arbitration agreement may not be enforceable out-
side the United States. Although this represents a vexing problem for arbitrators, the costs are
ultimately borne by the parties, providing them with sufficient incentive to avoid the problem.
Under a regime of arbitrator liability, parties can avoid this problem simply by stating in the ar-
bitration agreement that all applicable mandatory laws are subject to arbitration.
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Admittedly, there will be some cases in which the risk of bias remains,
but a large share of the potential instances of bias is eliminated.
A second reason why concerns about bias might be mitigated by
arbitrator liability turns on the nature of the bias. In some contexts,
the concern may not be that courts are biased in favor of local parties,
but rather that they are biased against litigants of certain nationali-
ties.145 Thus, for example, an American doing business in Jordan may
fear that courts there will be biased against him, but an arbitrator
from Egypt may not have that fear. Under arbitrator liability, the par-
ties could mitigate the risk of bias by selecting an arbitrator, such as
the one from Egypt, who is unlikely to be a target of bias in that fo-
rum. One can imagine a more dramatic example featuring a transac-
tion between an American and a non-American in which both sides
agree on a American arbitrator. In this case, there is no reason to ex-
pect that the courts will be biased against the American arbitrator if
he is sued by the U.S. party. These examples are specific illustrations
of a more general point: in many instances, it will be possible for the
parties to select an arbitrator who can resolve the controversy in an
unbiased fashion and who is less concerned about judicial bias than
are the parties.
A third reason why bias is less of an issue under arbitrator liabil-
ity is that disputes between arbitrators and plaintiffs may simply be
less prone to judicial bias than cases involving review of arbitral
awards. Arbitrators and arbitration associations are repeat players,
and, therefore, they are able to develop reputations for honest deal-
ing. When these parties appear before a national court, their reputa-
tions may cause judges to be less suspicious of them than the judges
are of foreign private parties that are litigating a claim. Furthermore,
the fact that the plaintiff chose the arbitrator may indicate to the
court that the arbitrator should be treated fairly and without bias.
B. Level of Liability
Holding arbitrators liable for a failure to apply mandatory laws
corrects their incentive to ignore those rules, but only if damages are
set appropriately. The appropriate level of liability depends on two
variables: the value the parties to a transaction place on avoiding a
145. Equivalently, the courts may have biases in favor of parties from certain parts of the
world. For example, American courts may have a bias in favor of litigants from North America
or Europe, Chilean courts may have a bias in favor of Latin American litigants, and so on.
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mandatory rule and the probability that an arbitrator who ignores a
mandatory rule will be found liable for her misconduct.146 Assume
that the ability to avoid a mandatory rule is worth an amount, X, to
the parties—meaning that avoiding the mandatory rule represents a
joint savings of X dollars. When the parties establish their contract,
they will be willing to pay up to X dollars to have the arbitrator ig-
nore the mandatory rule in the event of a dispute. If an arbitrator who
chooses to ignore a mandatory rule is always penalized for that deci-
sion, imposing damages of X dollars corrects the arbitrator’s incen-
tives.
If, instead, arbitrators who ignore mandatory rules are penalized
only some of the time—with probability p—the level of liability must
be adjusted to take this fact into account. In this situation, an arbitra-
tor found to have failed to apply a mandatory rule should be required
to pay an amount X/p. This amount represents the ex ante gain to the
parties when the mandatory rule is ignored, inflated to account for
the probability that an arbitrator who ignores such a rule will avoid
detection. For example, if the parties to the transaction are willing to
pay $1000 to avoid a mandatory rule, and if the probability that an
arbitrator who ignores such a rule will be caught is 25%, then an arbi-
trator who is found to have ignored the rule should face $4000 in li-
ability.
Note how choosing the correct level of liability generates the
proper incentives for the arbitrator. If liability is set at X/p, an arbitra-
tor who plans to ignore a mandatory rule faces an expected cost of
X.147 Assuming that the market for arbitration services is competitive,
all of this cost will be passed on to the arbitrator’s clients.148 Impor-
tantly, only those clients seeking to avoid a mandatory rule will have
to pay this additional cost. For parties that are prepared to have man-
datory laws apply to a transaction, there is no danger to the arbitra-
tor, and the parties need not pay an additional fee.149 Parties that seek
146. Other relevant variables are discussed and incorporated in the remaining sections of
Part III.
147. That is, if the arbitrator is found to be liable, she will have to pay X/p, but she will be
found liable only with probability p. The expected cost of ignoring a mandatory rule is, there-
fore, X.
148. Assuming that arbitration services is a competitive industry makes the presentation
simpler, but analogous results would still hold under an assumption of an imperfectly competi-
tive market for arbitration services.
149. The underlying assumption here is that arbitrators are never found liable when they
have applied the mandatory rule in good faith. This assumption is relaxed below.
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to contract with an arbitrator in order to avoid a mandatory rule,
therefore, will have to pay an additional X dollars—the value they
place on avoiding the mandatory rule. Thus, the liability imposed on
the arbitrator and passed on to the parties makes the parties indiffer-
ent between application or avoidance of the mandatory rule. If the
rule is applied, the parties give up a benefit of X, but they also avoid
the additional cost of X, which the arbitrator would demand in order
to ignore the mandatory rule.150
C. Repeated Games
The discussion up to this point has been based on a one-shot
game between arbitrators and the parties to a transaction. In this
game, the arbitrator has no incentive to enforce a contract in violation
of mandatory laws because to do so imposes liability on the arbitra-
tor. Appropriate damages ensure that mandatory rules are respected.
It is elementary game theory that one-shot results also apply to re-
peated games of a finite duration.151
The analysis becomes more complex, however, when we consider
infinitely repeated games. In particular, there is a theoretical possi-
bility that an arbitrator would develop a strong reputation for en-
forcing contracts even in the face of mandatory rules and that such a
reputation would sustain an equilibrium in which parties to a contract
were able to avoid mandatory rules. Given a sufficiently strong repu-
tation, an arbitrator could demand additional payment up front to
compensate for the liability that she would face after the arbitration.
Consider another variation on our example.
Example. Suppose that the issuer and the investor contract for the
sale of securities. They also contract for the arbitration of future dis-
putes and a waiver of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
The arbitration clause stipulates that an arbitrator from XYZ Arbi-
tration Association will be selected. This arbitration association has
a strong reputation for enforcing the terms of contracts even when
150. It is assumed that the arbitrator can commit—through reputation—to ignore manda-
tory rules when the parties instruct him to do so. If this assumption is not made, parties are even
less likely to try to ignore mandatory rules because there is a risk that they will pay the arbitra-
tor an additional amount, X, only to have the arbitrator apply the mandatory rule. That is, the
arbitrator may choose to “cheat” and to apply the mandatory rule in order to avoid liability
even after charging for the risk of that liability. Results similar to those developed in the text
could be generated without this assumption, the main difference being that the required level of
liability would be lower.
151. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-65 (1994).
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they are in violation of mandatory laws.152 XYZ’s fees are higher
than the industry average because the association is frequently sued
by parties that lose in arbitration and subsequently claim that the as-
sociation failed to apply mandatory laws. Specifically, the associa-
tion charges the market rate for arbitration plus an amount equal to
the arbitrator’s expected future liability. Call this second component
of the arbitrator’s fee X. The parties are willing to pay this higher
fee because any liability placed on the arbitrator will be paid back to
them (in expectation).153 Should there be a claim of fraud that is
taken to arbitration, the arbitrator may be tempted to apply the
mandatory antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws, but, if the re-
putational effect is strong enough, she will prefer to enforce the con-
tractual waiver of those provisions. Following the arbitration, the
losing party can sue the arbitrator and will be awarded the amount
X. The net result is that the arbitrator is paid the standard arbitra-
tion fee in exchange for her work and the parties succeed in waiving
the mandatory rules.
As the example shows, for any fixed level of damages, there ex-
ists an equilibrium in which an arbitrator with a sufficiently strong
reputation for enforcing contracts according to their terms enables
the parties to avoid mandatory rules. For a variety of reasons, how-
ever, arbitrator liability makes such an equilibrium unlikely.
First, it is important to recognize that the mere existence of an
equilibrium provides very little information about which equilibria
are likely. In infinitely repeated games, virtually any equilibrium is
possible.154 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that we can identify an
equilibrium that permits the parties to avoid mandatory laws. The
more important question is whether that equilibrium can be sup-
ported under reasonable assumptions.
The equilibrium being considered requires that the discount rate
of the arbitrator be low enough to prevent defection. Imagine an arbi-
152. Assume further that the reputation is completely lost if the arbitrator ever applies a
mandatory law over a contrary contractual provision.
153. Obviously, there is a question of how the parties to the transaction share the costs of
the arbitrator. We need not worry about this issue, however, because the parties will always
structure their contract with the arbitrator to maximize the total value of their transaction.
Whatever side payments are necessary between the parties will be made.
154. This is referred to as the Folk Theorem, which states that, “[i]n an infinitely repeated n-
person game with finite action sets at each repetition, any combination of actions observed in
any finite number of repetitions is the unique outcome of some subgame perfect equilibrium
given.” ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
92 (1989).
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trator with a strong reputation for enforcing contractual provisions
over mandatory rules. Suppose further that an arbitrator who “de-
fects” by applying a mandatory law that contradicts a contractual
provision suffers a complete loss of reputation; thereafter, it is always
assumed that he will apply mandatory rules over contractual provi-
sions.155 Finally, assume a discount rate of r. An arbitrator who never
defects will receive a stream of payments equal to the fee of an arbi-
trator who ignores mandatory rules (F) in every period.156 This implies
a present discounted value of F(1+r)/r.157 Compare this to the payoff
for an arbitrator who defects in the first period. Defection yields a
payment in the first period of the fee for an arbitrator who ignores
mandatory rules (F), plus the additional payment received by the ar-
bitrator to account for the expected liability of an arbitrator who ig-
nores mandatory rules (X). In subsequent periods, the arbitrator re-
ceives payment as an arbitrator who enforces mandatory rules (L).
This yields a present value of:
PV = F + X + L/(1+r) + L/(1+r)2 + . . .
= F + X + L(1+r)/r – L
It is possible to sustain an equilibrium in which the arbitrator ig-
nores mandatory rules only if defection is worth less than nondefec-
tion. Comparing the payoffs from defection and nondefection shows
that the equilibrium can be sustained if and only if:
F(1+r)/r > F + X + L(1+r)/r - L
Simplifying, this implies:
F > L + Xr
It is, therefore, impossible to sustain the equilibrium under considera-
tion if the discount rate, r, is high, or if the value of avoiding the man-
datory rule, X, is high.
If we add the realistic assumption that different parties place dif-
ferent values on the avoidance of mandatory rules, then an equilib-
rium in which arbitrators ignore mandatory rules seems even more
unlikely. Individual parties that do not value avoidance of the rule as
155. These assumptions are as favorable as possible to a reputational equilibrium in which
mandatory rules are avoided.
156. For simplicity, it is assumed that the arbitrator handles one case in each period.
157. That is, the value of the payments is F + F/(1+r) + F/(1+r)2 + . . . = F(1+r)/r.
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much as others will be unwilling to pay the premium demanded by
arbitrators who ignore mandatory laws. That is, parties that would
prefer to avoid mandatory rules but that value doing so at less than F-
L will prefer to select an arbitrator who applies mandatory rules. This
generates a form of lemons problem.158 The remaining pool of transac-
tions consists of those parties that value avoiding the mandatory rules
the most. This increases the expected damages faced by an arbitrator.
An increase in expected damages drives up the difference between
the fees charged by arbitrators who enforce mandatory laws (L) and
those who do not (F). This causes more parties to choose arbitrators
who enforce mandatory rules, which again increases the expected
damages, which drives L and F still further apart, and so on. The end
result is a collapse of the equilibrium in which arbitrators ignore
mandatory rules.
There are additional reasons why the equilibrium under consid-
eration is unlikely. First, the above discussion makes the extreme as-
sumption that a single transaction can ruin an arbitrator’s reputation.
If a more moderate assumption is made—for example, suppose that it
is difficult to observe perfectly when an arbitrator defects, implying
that the penalty for defection will be much less severe—defection be-
comes more attractive and undermines the equilibrium. Second, it
may be extremely difficult to develop a reputation for ignoring man-
datory rules. It may require a long period of doing so without being
fully compensated for the ensuing liability. Even with a low discount
rate, it is unlikely to prove worthwhile to embark on a strategy of de-
veloping such a reputation. Third, the equilibrium requires a large up-
front outlay by the parties to the transaction. If one of the parties is
liquidity-constrained—as will frequently be the case for investors in
securities transactions, for example—that party may not be able to
pay the arbitrator the amount necessary to cover both the fee and the
payment required to cover future liability.
If there nevertheless remains a concern about the existence of an
equilibrium in which the parties compensate the arbitrator for poten-
tial future liability, adjusting the level of damages could prevent such
an outcome. For example, rather than imposing liability equal to the
ex ante gain to the parties from avoiding the mandatory rule, liability
could be set at an amount equal to that ex ante gain plus the fee re-
ceived by the arbitrator. For an arbitrator who seeks to apply manda-
158. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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tory rules, this would represent a modest increase in expected liabil-
ity, assuming that courts sometimes impose such liability inappropri-
ately. For arbitrators who ignore mandatory rules, however, liability
of this sort would be crippling. Unlike the equilibrium discussed
above, this relationship would not permit the arbitrator to increase
her fees as compensation for future liability, because liability would
be a function of those fees. Though not the optimal result, this strat-
egy would still provide access to arbitration for most transactions in
which arbitration is preferred over the court system.
Finally, it is important to note that whatever assumptions one
makes about the behavior of the parties and the arbitrator in an infi-
nitely repeated game, the current system is much more likely to lead
to an avoidance of mandatory rules than is arbitrator liability. Cur-
rently, an arbitrator who ignores mandatory rules faces no penalty. If
there is no cost to ignoring mandatory rules, there is no reason for an
arbitrator with a reputation for doing so to defect. Under arbitrator
liability, the cost of ignoring mandatory rules can be substantial,
making defection more attractive.
D. Extension and Responses to Potential Objections
1. Excessive Litigation. One potential concern regarding
arbitrator liability is that it would promote too much litigation. If the
losing party in an arbitration always has the ability to sue the
arbitrator, the argument might go, such suits will arise in virtually
every arbitration. There are several reasons why this concern is
misplaced.
First, it is well established that parties to a dispute will agree on a
settlement when they have the same information. It is only when the
plaintiff is more optimistic about his chances at trial than is the de-
fendant that the parties will fail to settle.159 This same result holds in
the arbitration context. Where both the potential plaintiff and the ar-
bitrator are able to anticipate the result of an arbitrator liability claim,
they will settle, avoiding the expense of a lawsuit. In the majority of
159. The literature on litigation and settlement is well developed, and it is beyond the scope
of this Article to explore all the variations on the likelihood of settlement. The most relevant
articles for present purposes are John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 279, 286 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 61, 66 (1971); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a
Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 338 (1982).
GUZMAN TO PRINTER (FINAL).DOC 09/21/00 12:59 PM
2000] ARBITRATOR LIABILITY 1325
cases, the arbitrator will apply the relevant mandatory rules, and the
losing party will recognize that her probability of success in a suit
against the arbitrator is small. Because both parties recognize that the
losing party has little hope of winning in court, they will settle the
case for a small amount, or perhaps even nothing. If, on the other
hand, the arbitrator has ignored the mandatory rule despite his incen-
tive to follow it, and this is verifiable, both parties will recognize that
the losing party has a viable claim against the arbitrator and will, ac-
cordingly, settle for a relatively large amount. Only when the parties
have divergent expectations will settlement be difficult.160
Existing rules governing both arbitration and litigation before
courts demonstrate that a right to access the courts does not neces-
sarily lead to a flood of litigation. For example, under existing rules,
the losing party in an arbitration has the right to seek judicial inter-
vention.161 This is possible either through an attempt to avoid en-
forcement of the award or through a separate suit under relevant do-
mestic laws. Nevertheless, the majority of arbitral awards are paid by
the losing party without appeal to these judicial mechanisms. The
same result is observed in litigation. Only a small fraction of all par-
ties with disputes make a court filing, and only a small percentage of
those that file actually go to trial.162 The vast majority of cases settle.
The same can be expected of arbitrator liability disputes. There is no
reason to think that there would be any more litigation when the
available remedy is a suit against the arbitrator rather than an appeal
from a court case.
Furthermore, one need not fear an avalanche of litigation be-
cause arbitrator liability would lead to a more consistent application
of mandatory rules by arbitrators. Because arbitrators have no incen-
tive to ignore mandatory rules under arbitrator liability, they will ap-
ply those rules. When the arbitrator applies mandatory laws, a party
that has lost in arbitration will also expect to lose before the courts.
160. In fact, divergent expectations are not sufficient. It is necessary that the plaintiff expect
a higher judgment than does the defendant. If the defendant expects a larger judgment to be
handed down by the court than does the plaintiff, there will be settlement.
161. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1994).
162. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 5 (1983); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1984); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983).
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There is, therefore, little incentive to pursue further costly litigation
because there is little hope that the outcome will be affected.163
2. Risk and Risk-Averse Arbitrators. Liability for failure to
apply mandatory laws would expose arbitrators to risk. One risk is
that the arbitrator will be held liable in particular cases in which she
ignores mandatory rules. Another is that the arbitrator may, due to
judicial error, be held liable even when the arbitrator applies
mandatory rules in good faith.
There are two important sources of concern with respect to the
risk of judicial error. The first is that arbitrators may be overly cau-
tious in their application of mandatory laws. That is, even in cases
where the mandatory rule should not apply, or where it should apply
but the party seeking its application should nevertheless lose, an arbi-
trator may issue a decision in favor of the party seeking application of
the rule in order to protect himself from suit. By applying a manda-
tory rule in close cases—even if the mandatory rule is not applica-
ble—the arbitrator insulates himself from liability. This behavior, of
course, is harmful because the rule, as applied by the arbitrator, will
be stricter than the rule adopted by the relevant government. Con-
sider the following example.
Example. Suppose that the issue before an arbitrator is the applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws to a transaction that took place abroad.
Imagine that the arbitrator must determine whether the United
States has subject matter jurisdiction over the transaction. Finally,
suppose that, after applying the U.S. test for subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the arbitrator believes in good faith that a U.S. court would not
find subject matter jurisdiction on the facts of the case. Despite this
view, however, the arbitrator may be concerned about potential li-
ability if he rules that U.S. law does not apply. To protect himself
from a possible suit by the party that seeks application of that law,
he rules that U.S. antitrust laws apply. Thus, U.S. law is applied even
though it would not be applied by U.S. courts.
163. In a similar vein, the decision of an arbitrator who applies mandatory laws may provide
the parties with information regarding the strength of their respective positions. This additional
information may cause parties with divergent expectations to settle prior to litigation. If the ar-
bitrator is expected to ignore the mandatory rule, his decision provides much less information
about how a court, which will apply the mandatory rule, might rule. In this case, therefore, arbi-
trator liability encourages settlement prior to judicial intervention in a way that judicial review
does not.
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The above example, however, omits half the story. Just as the
party that wants application of the mandatory rule would have a
claim against the arbitrator if the mandatory law were not applied,
the party that sought to avoid the mandatory rule would have an
equal right to pursue a claim if the arbitrator applied a mandatory
rule inappropriately. In other words, arbitrator liability would impose
a duty on the arbitrator to apply mandatory rules in the same fashion
as would a national court. The arbitrator could be sued for a failure to
apply the law when it should be applied or for applying it when it
should not be applied. An arbitrator, therefore, would have no reason
to do anything other than attempt to apply mandatory rules in the
same circumstances and in the same fashion as they would be applied
by courts in the relevant jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the arbitrator must be compensated for accepting
the risk of liability. One would therefore expect the costs of arbitra-
tion to increase at least slightly. Once again, however, the incentives
would work to ensure that arbitrators respect mandatory laws. In or-
der to attract customers, arbitrators compete not only through the
quality of their decisions and the desirability of their procedures, but
also on price. An arbitrator who routinely follows mandatory rules
will be able to offer her customers a lower price because she faces less
chance of being held liable for the failure to apply such rules. Simi-
larly, as between two arbitrators who seek to apply mandatory rules
when appropriate, the more capable arbitrator will be able to charge
a lower price because he will interpret the laws more accurately and,
therefore, face fewer lawsuits.
An arbitrator is likely to take action in order to reduce the risk of
liability. The actions arbitrators are most likely to take are, for the
most part, good for the arbitral process and the legal system. The
most obvious way for an arbitrator to protect herself from future liti-
gation is to follow the mandatory rule at issue and to provide a rea-
soned decision that explains why she applied the rule and how the
rule led to her decision. A written decision of this sort provides three
important advantages for the arbitrator. First, if one of the parties
sues the arbitrator, the decision will provide evidence that she fol-
lowed the applicable mandatory laws. Second, in the event of a law-
suit, the opinion represents a form of advocacy, outlining the reason-
ing of the arbitrator and explaining why the decision was correct.
Third, if a party threatens to sue, the written decision will increase the
probability that the parties will have the same expectations about how
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a court would decide the question—increasing the probability of early
settlement.
The second source of concern regarding arbitrator behavior is
that arbitrators are risk-averse and may demand very high compensa-
tion in order to accept the risk of liability. Although it is certainly true
that arbitrators may be risk-averse, there are several reasons to think
that they would not require excessive compensation in order to par-
ticipate.164 First, many arbitrators are repeat players. An arbitrator
who sits on many panels might find himself liable from time to time,
but this risk would be spread over many cases. By charging a small
premium for each case, the arbitrator could self-insure against this
risk. Note also that this form of self-insurance would be more expen-
sive for arbitrators who ignored mandatory rules on a regular basis.
Such arbitrators would be more likely, in any given case, to be found
liable by a court and, therefore, would have to charge a higher pre-
mium to their customers. This, in turn, would give arbitrators who
applied mandatory rules a price advantage.
Second, even when an individual arbitrator is risk-averse, an ar-
bitration association is likely to be risk-neutral. Like the repeat-player
arbitrator in the previous paragraph, an arbitration association han-
dles a large number of arbitration cases and is able to spread the risk
of liability over them. If the arbitration association is risk-neutral (or
even if it is less risk-averse than the arbitrator), both it and the arbi-
trator will find it advantageous for the association to insure the arbi-
trator. This form of insurance simply represents a transfer of the risk
of liability from the arbitrator to the association. A transfer of this
sort is likely because the risk-neutral association can bear the risk at
lower cost than can the risk-averse arbitrator. From a policy perspec-
tive, it might even be desirable to hold the association jointly liable
for the failure of the arbitrator to comply with mandatory rules. Joint
liability has the additional benefits of reducing the risk that arbitra-
tors will be damage-proof and giving the losing party in the arbitra-
tion a greater set of options in bringing a suit for failure to apply a
mandatory law. It also forces the arbitration association either to pool
its individual arbitrators’ risks or to charge higher fees for arbitrators
that ignore mandatory laws. Regardless of the approach the associa-
164. Notice that, if arbitrators are risk-averse, the risk that arbitrator liability will lead to
litigation is reduced beyond what is suggested in Part III.D.1, because risk-averse parties prefer
settlement to litigation, making it possible for them to settle even when risk-neutral parties
would not do so.
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tion takes, it is forced to internalize the costs of liability—causing it to
monitor the behavior of its arbitrators and to adjust its fees accord-
ingly.
Another option for arbitrators is to purchase insurance to cover
their losses. An arbitrator who purchases insurance to cover her li-
ability will still have an incentive to apply mandatory rules because
the insurance company will want to monitor her behavior and adjust
her premiums to reflect the risk of liability.
In addition to the arbitrator and the association, the parties to
the transaction are available to bear some of the risk of a lawsuit. Al-
though arbitrator liability does not allow a waiver of the right to sue
arbitrators, there is no reason to prevent an agreement under which
the winning party in the arbitration would have to indemnify the arbi-
trator against liability. Indemnification simply transfers the cost of a
failure to apply the mandatory rule directly to the parties.
All of the above options go to the question of who should bear
the risk. If this is left to private ordering, the least risk-averse party
will agree to bear the risk for an appropriate fee. This does not un-
dermine the arbitrator liability scheme because the fee charged to
bear the risk will reflect the likelihood and magnitude of liability.
3. Relaxing Informational Assumptions. The above discussion
assumes that all the parties know, at all times, whether the arbitrator
will apply the rule. Suppose instead that it is not known until the
dispute arises whether the arbitrator will have to choose between the
content of the arbitration agreement and a mandatory rule. This
might occur, for example, if the exact issues to be raised are not
known until the arbitration begins. If, for example, the litigation
strategy of one of the parties changes or new information becomes
available during the arbitration, there may be questions regarding the
applicability of a mandatory rule that were not anticipated at the start
of the case.
If prior to the start of the arbitration—at the time the parties and
the arbitrator agree on a fee—there is a probability, k, that the arbi-
trator will be asked to ignore a mandatory rule, and assuming that the
arbitrator plans to do so if asked, the expected liability of the arbitra-
tor is kX. This represents the arbitrator’s expected liability for ignor-
ing a mandatory rule, discounted by the probability that she will face
such a rule. This is the cost that will be passed on to the parties. The
ex ante benefit to the parties of having an arbitrator who will ignore
mandatory rules is simply the value of avoiding the mandatory rules,
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X, discounted by the probability that the arbitrator will have to resist
application of those rules, k. Thus, the parties must pay an additional
kX to hire an arbitrator who is willing to ignore mandatory rules, and
this is exactly the same as the expected benefit of hiring such an arbi-
trator. Once again, the parties are indifferent between having the
mandatory rules applied or having them ignored.
It is also possible to relax the assumption that arbitrators who
apply mandatory rules will never be found liable. Instead, assume that
an arbitrator who does so will wrongly be found liable in some cases.
The presence of these “false positives” can be accommodated simply
by adjusting the level of damages. Assume further that an arbitrator
who applies all mandatory rules in good faith will nevertheless be
found liable with probability γ. The level of damages that will provide
the appropriate level of deterrence is an amount, D, such that the ex-
pected liability of ignoring a mandatory rule exceeds the expected li-
ability from applying that rule by X, the expected benefit from ig-
noring the rule. Thus, the correct level of liability is given by pD-γD =
X, which can be simplified to D = X/(p-γ). If damages are set equal to
D, arbitrators will face the correct incentives even if courts occasion-
ally impose liability on an arbitrator who has applied all mandatory
laws.
The above discussion establishes the level of liability, given the
probability that an arbitrator who ignores mandatory rules will be
found liable. That probability will be higher or lower depending on
the burden of proof that is imposed on the plaintiff in such a suit. As a
matter of deterrence, any burden of proof can be accommodated by
adjusting the level of liability. The burden of proof merely determines
p, the probability that the court will find liable an arbitrator who has
ignored a mandatory rule, and γ, the probability of false positives. As
long as the level of liability, X, is adjusted appropriately, it is possible
to achieve the desired level of deterrence.165
Example. Suppose that a mandatory rule imposes on a transaction a
net cost of $1000. Assume also that an arbitrator who ignores this
mandatory rule will be found liable 25% of the time and that an ar-
bitrator who applies the mandatory rule will be found liable 5% of
the time. In order to generate the proper incentives, damages should
be set at $5000 ($1000/(.25-.05)). Faced with the mandatory rule, the
arbitrator can choose to ignore it, in which case he faces expected li-
165. This is a version of results developed in the famous paper by Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180-81 (1968).
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ability of $1250. Alternatively, he can apply the mandatory rule, in
which case his expected liability is $250. Therefore, he will require
that the parties pay him an additional $1000 to ignore the mandatory
rule. This amount is equal to the value that the parties place on
avoiding the mandatory rule, making them indifferent between
avoiding the rule or having it apply.
Finally, it is possible to relax the assumption that the parties to a
transaction are able to identify, ex ante, arbitrators who are prepared
to ignore mandatory rules. If it is not possible to distinguish those
who apply mandatory rules from those who do not—implying that re-
putational mechanisms are insufficient to separate the two groups—
then arbitrator liability provides an even stronger incentive for arbitra-
tors to follow mandatory laws. If the parties to a transaction cannot
identify arbitrators who will ignore mandatory rules in favor of the
arbitration agreement, the parties must use some other criteria to se-
lect arbitrators. Because arbitrators who follow mandatory rules face
a lower expected level of liability, they are able to offer a lower price,
making them more attractive. Assuming, once again, that the arbitra-
tion industry is competitive, the cost advantage of arbitrators who ap-
ply mandatory rules will drive those who ignore such rules out of the
market. The only sustainable equilibrium in this environment is one
in which all arbitrators apply mandatory rules.
4. Verifiability. Courts charged with reviewing an arbitral
decision under existing U.S. rules often must overcome significant
informational problems. A court sitting in review of an award may
have difficulty determining whether a mandatory rule was applied.
Even when the arbitrators’ actions are observable to the parties, it
may be impossible for a court to verify that a mandatory rule was
considered appropriately. This outcome is precisely what the parties
to a transaction want if they wish to avoid a mandatory rule. If the
parties know whether the arbitrator has followed the mandatory rule
but the courts do not, the arbitrator has an incentive to follow the
wishes of the parties in order to develop his reputation for doing so.
By selecting an arbitrator who does not customarily issue reasoned
decisions, for example, an arbitration agreement can make it virtually
impossible for the losing party in the arbitration to have a court
reverse the decision. Because the arbitrator has an incentive to ignore
the mandatory rules in order to increase his reputation as an
arbitrator who gives the parties what they want, a lack of review
means the parties can achieve their goal of avoiding a mandatory rule.
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Although arbitrator liability does not completely resolve the
problem of verifiability, it does reduce the magnitude of the problem
relative to the current system. First, as discussed above, arbitrator li-
ability gives the arbitrator an incentive to produce a reasoned deci-
sion, whereas current law provides no such incentive.166 With a rea-
soned decision, of course, it is much easier for a court to determine
whether the arbitrator applied a mandatory rule to the dispute. Sec-
ond, because arbitrator liability brings the arbitrator herself before a
court, she has an opportunity to explain how she arrived at her deci-
sion. This provides an arbitrator who considered a mandatory rule the
opportunity to show that she did so and gives the court an opportu-
nity to assess her credibility. By bringing the arbitrator before a court,
arbitrator liability increases the likelihood that arbitral decisions will
be verifiable.
5. Jurisdiction. If arbitrator liability is to have the desired
impact on the incentives of arbitrators and the parties to a
transaction, not only must the substantive right to sue exist but so
must the procedural ability to bring the arbitrator under the
jurisdiction of the relevant national courts. Because international
arbitration can take place in virtually any location, and because
arbitrators may be of any nationality, a country may lack personal
jurisdiction over the arbitrator. This, however, is unlikely to present a
serious problem and, in any case, can easily be addressed.
The problem of jurisdiction is unlikely to be a serious one be-
cause the principal arbitration associations will meet the requirements
of personal jurisdiction in most cases. In the United States, for exam-
ple, personal jurisdiction exists over all the major arbitration associa-
tions based on their contacts with the country. Even if personal juris-
diction does not exist, it can easily be ensured by requiring that
arbitrators consent to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The consent of a
party to a contract is sufficient to establish jurisdiction over that per-
son or entity.167 The necessary consent can be obtained by refusing to
enforce arbitration agreements or arbitral awards in the absence of
such consent. Such a policy implies that the agreement to arbitrate is
166. See supra Part III.D.2.
167. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 704 (1982) (referring specifically to agreements to arbitrate); National Equip. Rental, Ltd.
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to
the jurisdiction of a given court . . . .”).
GUZMAN TO PRINTER (FINAL).DOC 09/21/00 12:59 PM
2000] ARBITRATOR LIABILITY 1333
not a credible commitment unless the arbitrator has submitted to the
jurisdiction of the United States. Parties to a transaction then have an
incentive to select arbitrators (or arbitration associations) that have
submitted to U.S. jurisdiction; otherwise, the agreement to arbitrate
can be avoided at any time simply by pursuing legal remedies in U.S.
courts. Arbitrators, in turn, would have an incentive to submit to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts in order to attract business.168
Conditioning recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
on jurisdiction over the arbitrator should be permissible under the
New York Convention’s public policy exception. There is no doubt
that a country can refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award when to do so would undermine the mandatory laws of that
country.169 Requiring that arbitrators submit to local jurisdiction rep-
resents a less intrusive and more effective mechanism to achieve the
same public policy objectives.
CONCLUSION
The increased popularity and importance of arbitration in both
domestic and international business make the study of arbitration and
its legal regulations imperative. The acceptance and, indeed, encour-
agement of arbitration clauses promise significant benefits to the par-
ties to a contract—in the form of lower costs and greater flexibility—
and to the legal system as a whole—in the form of a reduced burden
on courts. If we cannot rely on arbitrators to apply the law, however,
disputes that are deemed arbitrable are taken beyond the reach of
legislators. Because arbitrators and arbitration associations owe their
allegiance to the marketplace rather than to the state, arbitrators have
an incentive to follow the wishes of the parties rather than those of
lawmakers. In contracts that have no third-party effects and that are
formed by consensual parties able to protect their own interests, there
is reason to permit the parties to opt out of legal rules as they see fit.
Where third-party effects are present, however, or where one or more
of the parties is unable to protect her interests, legislators sometimes
choose to regulate these transactions through the implementation of
mandatory rules.
168. In a similar fashion, of course, arbitrators will have an incentive to submit to the juris-
diction of other countries that adopt arbitrator liability.
169. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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This Article is the first to demonstrate that the benefits of arbi-
tration can be reconciled with the objectives of mandatory rules. A
policy of arbitrator liability would align the incentives of arbitrators
and the parties with those of the government. Rather than relying on
heavy-handed judicial review of arbitral decisions, arbitrator liability
relies on the parties themselves to exercise their private right of ac-
tion if an arbitrator fails to behave appropriately.
